Hey guys,
FWIW here is kind of an AAR:
In case it wasn't evident enough, that was my first attempt at commanding a human squad in ArmA, and one that came as a complete surprise after a few weeks of not playing ArmA let alone preparing for the role. I was already feeling kind of terrible for holding things up and getting all you guys to wait for me (I think it took 1/2hr or more) while I grappled with PlayWith updates and tech issues, and to suddenly then take on the commander role, it was all too improvised, unexpected, rushed and unprepared. Definitely not what some of you more experienced players are used to. Apologies for that.
I would however describe the opportunity and experience as both exciting, frustrating and from a command point a view, very inadequate and in need of much work and improvement.
I had a clear idea of how to approach the mission however, but communicating it to all team members so that it was clear and understood so that it gets executed accordingly left much to be desired. I certainly wasn't using the kind of efficient mil-style language I have heard others like DoubleD use quite effectively. Hearing it really puts you in the zone. What was heard from me kind of puts you out of the zone. This was the source of the frustration which ultimately led to a kind of communication paralysis, especially when the firing and chaos started happening, where I just found myself lost and fumbling for the right things to say and directions to give. I also did grapple with the "how much instruction is too much instruction" aspect of things. I know how frustrating it can be taking directions from an appointed leader who just doesn't know how to communicate properly/efficiently. Again sorry about that.
When we started taking fire and some of us went down, the drop in institutional awareness and knowing who was up and who wasn't didn't help things. I actually wasn't even sure if the UI was able to tell me who was potentially unconscious (and hence unable to use voice comms) and who was OK (green) without me always having to ask. Spent a lot of time myself unconscious unaware of why I wasn't dead/finished off. Later found out that the enemy AI considered wounded players in need of aid essentially invisible.
To efficiently manage a squad like we had needed more preparation and planning on my behalf. Given the improvised/unprepared/rushed nature of being given the task of mission leader after holding the team up for so long, here are some further points I think are still worth making:
1. As mission leader, the only briefing I got was verbally from DoubleD as I fumbled my way with PlayWith6 prior to the mission. Can't be certain of what I missed but, I began the mission without the folllowing information
a) The time of the mission, and implications it had on the need to equip NV goggles. This oversight had huge implications on the mission as myself, Vart and I think one other member didn't equip with NVs at the base. By the time we started making our approach towards the heli crash site, it had become dark enough to provide a distinct advantage to those who had NV. That group of enemy at the rocky wall held us up quite a bit more than I would have liked, with several of us needing buddy aid. Fortunately for us the dead enemy had NV we could scrounge.
b) A full understanding of what might be expected at the heli crash site. If it was mentioned I certainly didn't pick up on it. I certainly wasn't expecting to capture unarmed passengers/crew standing around the crash site as was the case. I hence felt pretty stupid when DoubleD asked "Do we have any zipties?" When had somehow made it to the mission objective relatively intact only to find we couldn't even capture the apparent mission objective, a lone unarmed crewman just waiting to be captured. There also was an OPFOR truck at the site which confused me somewhat. Whey was there still unarmed crew there waiting to be captured when OPFOR seemed to have already been there? Maybe I missed something else in the briefing. It was at this time, with the mission target just standing in front of us, that the enemy started approaching our position on the top of the wooded ridge from multiple sides. I never am a fan of fighting AI in woods, especially at night, as I know they have a spotting advantage of us mortal human players. Their auto spotting abilities among the tree trucks and shrubs that otherwise blind us players make them far more of a difficult an enemy to deal with than if they we had engaged them across open ground. It was at this point where the shit really hit the fan and many of us least of all myself, found ourselves unconscious waiting to be revived by some of our remaining team who were themselves in a very bad way.
2. At the start of the mission, I actually did want to discuss my basic mission plan through with probably one experienced team member to make sure I hadn't missed out on any important aspects about the mission and any interface/tech/comms issues before communicating it to the rest of the team. However, given all of you had waited long enough already, I didn't want to hold things up any longer. I realised that I also didn't ask anyone if they had any questions about the plan for the mission, which I think is good practice, even if we were in a bit of hurry to get along in the mission.
3. I do not believe there was anything that fundamentally wrong with the plan I had in mind....proceed cautiously beyond friendly locations in to unknown territory in an armored IFV and a HMG Hunter towards the crash site, avoiding roads/contact and suspected mine deployments, taking covered routes through woods where feasible....scouting on foot the last few hundred meters towards the crash site using the vehicle(s) as overwatch. As it turns out, with the IFV disabled in a RPG attack early on we just had to rely on our Hunter HMG.
4. I don't know if we ever found out but when we all disembarked in the woods and left our Hunters behind and scouted the town from the woodline, we actually had some enemy engage us in the woods from the direction from where we had left the unarmed Hunter (by that stage there we had already gone back to bring the HMG Hunter up with us) and someone reported smoke coming from the direction of where we had left the unarmed Hunter. I suspected but dint confirm that perhaps OPFOR destroyed it. If so we would have been short a spot or two in the remaining Hunter HMG for all 5 of us for our RTB anyway.
5. I was not fully aware of how effective any of the CAS and other support units we had on radio were going to be given our situation. By the time we needed them it was already dark and we were in a "hot spot" at the heli crash site. I have never really used CAS before so I was not sure of how accurate/effective it can be. One thing that I know that may have been handy given we were possibly down a seat in the Hunter for the return trip, was a heli evac which I think was available.
6. In hindsight, when we discovered that we could not restrain what potentially was our primary mission objective (the unarmed crewman at the crash site) because we did not have the zipties to do it, a decision should have been made quickly as to what to do next as loitering in enemy territory without a mission direction is just putting the team in undue danger. I was not 100% on what else might possibly constitute part of a successful mission in leui of failing in the primary objective. Was it worth generically "searching the crash site" for other stuff part of the mission? Perhaps we should have just killed the crewman instead. Perhaps he alerted the enemy to our presence while he was still alive (not sure how ArmA/ALIVE works with that). Anyway, had I known that it was the crewman or nothing else, I would have probably just killed him had the team make an immediate and quick withdrawal back to the remaining Hunter HMG and an RTB with a primary mission failure but safe team extraction. That didn't happen and we died alone and isolated on that bloody wooded hilltop. This really should have been a quick in and quick out mission where possible.
7. I have already mention mission preparedness or lack of it. I think given the mission and situation (enemy line infiltration, site recon and extraction in wooded terrain), it was almost a stealth job, I wonder if there would have been much value in at least packing suppressors on our weapons for some points within the mission. Probably not but worth throwing out there.
