The campaign continues
In the summer of 1944, Bomber Command attacked few cities. Most of its efforts went into support of the Allied ground forces, the bombing of Hitler's V rocket sites, and attacks on oil targets. Intercepted German signals traffic showed that the oil campaign was hugely successful and was starving the Nazis of vital fuel supplies.
Selective targeting, however, required clear weather - the process of bombing through cloud, relying on radar, was not accurate enough to hit specific targets. At the onset of winter, Bomber Command's focus shifted back onto area targets. In October and November 1944, Harris's force dropped more than 60% of their bomb tonnage on German cities.
... the last months of the war saw yet another escalation of the bombing war.
The Americans too found themselves moving towards area bombing of cities. Although they would continue to claim that they were engaged in 'precision' bombing of military targets, 80 per cent of their bombing missions in the last quarter of 1944 relied on radar. Half of their bombs missed the aiming point by more than two miles.
Hence the last months of the war saw yet another escalation of the bombing war. By then, most German towns of industrial importance were all but destroyed. Yet the Nazis were still fighting back. Every day, they were killing thousands on the battlefield and in the concentration camps. Hitler's V rockets were spreading death and terror amongst civilians in Britain.
As Max Hastings says, 'it would have seemed odd to almost everybody who was still fighting to tell all those air forces to stand down. So those air forces were allowed to continue to do things which it must be said in cold blood were a moral blemish, a moral blot perhaps on the conduct of the Allies'.
Since the heavy bombers were running out of targets, towns were now put on the target lists that had little military or industrial importance. Some of them, like Würzburg or Pforzheim, were selected primarily because they were easy for the bombers to find and destroy. Because they had a medieval centre, they were expected to be particularly vulnerable to fire attack.
The destruction of Dresden
Nobody could tell what the destruction of places like Würzburg could really contribute to the shortening of the war, but the hostilities had reached a point where the mere possibility of saving Allied lives was felt to justify the death of tens of thousands of civilians in German towns.
... refugees ... were considered legitimate targets ...
Moreover, Churchill thought that the bombing of communication centres in eastern Germany might aid the Soviet advance on Berlin. Bomber Command was ordered to attack Berlin, Dresden, Leipzig and other east German cities to 'cause confusion in the evacuation from the east' and 'hamper the movements of troops from the west'.
This directive led to the raid on Dresden and marked the erosion of one last moral restriction in the bombing war: the term 'evacuation from the east' did not refer to retreating troops but to the civilian refugees fleeing from the advancing Russians.
Although these refugees clearly did not contribute to the German war effort, they were considered legitimate targets simply because the chaos caused by attacks on them might obstruct German troop reinforcements to the Eastern Front.
... it was Churchill who was ultimately responsible for the raid on Dresden.
It is significant that only a few weeks after the raid on Dresden, on 28 March 1945, Churchill tried to dissociate himself from the destruction, and drafted the previously cited memorandum in which he denounced the bombing of cities as 'mere acts of terror and wanton destruction'.
The Prime Minister, however, had actively supported the bombing campaign all along and it was he who was ultimately responsible for the raid on Dresden. But with VE Day in sight, the moral standards of peacetime had become affordable again. In war, morality is a luxury - and some rules of engagement can prove impractical.
In the summer of 1944, Bomber Command attacked few cities. Most of its efforts went into support of the Allied ground forces, the bombing of Hitler's V rocket sites, and attacks on oil targets. Intercepted German signals traffic showed that the oil campaign was hugely successful and was starving the Nazis of vital fuel supplies.
Selective targeting, however, required clear weather - the process of bombing through cloud, relying on radar, was not accurate enough to hit specific targets. At the onset of winter, Bomber Command's focus shifted back onto area targets. In October and November 1944, Harris's force dropped more than 60% of their bomb tonnage on German cities.
... the last months of the war saw yet another escalation of the bombing war.
The Americans too found themselves moving towards area bombing of cities. Although they would continue to claim that they were engaged in 'precision' bombing of military targets, 80 per cent of their bombing missions in the last quarter of 1944 relied on radar. Half of their bombs missed the aiming point by more than two miles.
Hence the last months of the war saw yet another escalation of the bombing war. By then, most German towns of industrial importance were all but destroyed. Yet the Nazis were still fighting back. Every day, they were killing thousands on the battlefield and in the concentration camps. Hitler's V rockets were spreading death and terror amongst civilians in Britain.
As Max Hastings says, 'it would have seemed odd to almost everybody who was still fighting to tell all those air forces to stand down. So those air forces were allowed to continue to do things which it must be said in cold blood were a moral blemish, a moral blot perhaps on the conduct of the Allies'.
Since the heavy bombers were running out of targets, towns were now put on the target lists that had little military or industrial importance. Some of them, like Würzburg or Pforzheim, were selected primarily because they were easy for the bombers to find and destroy. Because they had a medieval centre, they were expected to be particularly vulnerable to fire attack.
The destruction of Dresden
Nobody could tell what the destruction of places like Würzburg could really contribute to the shortening of the war, but the hostilities had reached a point where the mere possibility of saving Allied lives was felt to justify the death of tens of thousands of civilians in German towns.
... refugees ... were considered legitimate targets ...
Moreover, Churchill thought that the bombing of communication centres in eastern Germany might aid the Soviet advance on Berlin. Bomber Command was ordered to attack Berlin, Dresden, Leipzig and other east German cities to 'cause confusion in the evacuation from the east' and 'hamper the movements of troops from the west'.
This directive led to the raid on Dresden and marked the erosion of one last moral restriction in the bombing war: the term 'evacuation from the east' did not refer to retreating troops but to the civilian refugees fleeing from the advancing Russians.
Although these refugees clearly did not contribute to the German war effort, they were considered legitimate targets simply because the chaos caused by attacks on them might obstruct German troop reinforcements to the Eastern Front.
... it was Churchill who was ultimately responsible for the raid on Dresden.
It is significant that only a few weeks after the raid on Dresden, on 28 March 1945, Churchill tried to dissociate himself from the destruction, and drafted the previously cited memorandum in which he denounced the bombing of cities as 'mere acts of terror and wanton destruction'.
The Prime Minister, however, had actively supported the bombing campaign all along and it was he who was ultimately responsible for the raid on Dresden. But with VE Day in sight, the moral standards of peacetime had become affordable again. In war, morality is a luxury - and some rules of engagement can prove impractical.