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600 years ago allied (Polish, Lithuanian, Ukrainian, Moldawian and Czech) forces won one of the biggest medieval battles against Teutonic order
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The precise number of soldiers involved has proven difficult to establish.[5] None of the contemporary sources provided reliable troop counts. Jan Długosz provided the number of the banners, the principal unit of each cavalry: 51 for the Knights, 50 for the Poles, and 40 for the Lithuanians.[31] However, it is unclear how many men were under each banner. The structure and number of infantry units (pikemen, archers, crossbowmen) and artillery units is unknown. Estimates, often biased by political and nationalistic considerations, were produced by various historians.[5] German historians tend to present lower numbers, while Polish historians tend to use higher estimates.[7] The high-end estimates by Polish historian Stefan Kuczyński of 39,000 Polish–Lithuanian and 27,000 Teutonic men[31] have been cited in western literature as "commonly accepted".[5][6][32]
While less numerous, the Teutonic army had advantages in discipline, military training, and superior military equipment.[29] Their heavy cavalry was one of the best in Europe. The Teutonic army was also equipped with bombards that could shoot lead and stone projectiles.[29] Both forces were composed of troops from several states and lands, including numerous mercenaries; for example, Bohemian mercenaries fought on each side.[33] The Knights also invited guest crusaders. Twenty-two different peoples, mostly Germanic, joined the Teutonic side.[34] Teutonic recruits included soldiers from Westphalia, Frisia, Austria, Swabia,[33] Stettin (Szczecin).[35] Two Hungarian nobles, Nicholas II Garay and Stibor of Stiboricz, brought 200 men for the Knights,[36] but support from Sigismund of Hungary was disappointing.[26]
Poland brought mercenaries from Moravia and Bohemia. The Czechs produced two full banners, under command of Jan Sokol of Lamberk.[1] Serving among the Czechs was Jan Žižka, future commander of the Hussite forces. Alexander the Good commanded Moldavian troops.[4] Vytautas gathered troops from Lithuanian and Ruthenian (modern Belarus and Ukraine) lands. The Lithuanian army included three banners from Smolensk, under the command of Jogaila's brother Lengvenis, and a contingent of Tatars of the Golden Horde, under the command of the exiled Khan Jalal ad-Din.[2] The overall commander of the joint Polish–Lithuanian forces was King Jogaila; however, he did not directly participate in the battle. The Lithuanian units were commanded directly by Grand Duke Vytautas, who was second in command and helped design the grand strategy of the campaign. Vytautas actively participated in the battle, managing both Lithuanian and Polish units.[37] Jan Długosz stated that the low-ranking Sword Bearer of the Crown Zyndram of Maszkowice commanded the Polish army, but that is highly doubtful.[38] More likely Marshal of the Crown Zbigniew of Brzezie commanded the Polish troops in the field.
[edit] Course of the battle
[edit] March into Prussia
The first stage of the Grunwald campaign was gathering all Polish–Lithuanian troops at Czerwinsk, a designated meeting point about 80 km (50 mi) from the Prussian border, where the joint army crossed the Vistula over a pontoon bridge.[39] This maneuver, which required precision and intense coordination among multi-ethnic forces, was accomplished in about a week from June 24 to June 30, 1410.[3] Polish soldiers from Greater Poland gathered in Poznań and those from Lesser Poland in Wolbórz. On June 24, 1410, Jogaila and Czech mercenaries arrived in Wolbórz.[3] Three days later, the Polish army was already at the meeting point. The Lithuanian army marched out from Vilnius on June 3 and joined up with the Ruthenian regiments in Hrodna.[3] They arrived in Czerwinsk on the same day as the Poles crossed the river. After the crossing, Masovian troops under Siemowit IV and Janusz I joined the Polish–Lithuanian army.[3] The massive force began its march north towards Marienburg (Malbork), capital of Prussia, on July 3. The Prussian border was crossed on July 9.[39]
The river crossing remained secret until Hungarian envoys, who were attempting to negotiate a peace, revealed it to the Teutonic Grand Master.[40] As soon as Ulrich von Jungingen grasped Polish–Lithuanian intentions, he left 3,000 men at Schwetz (Świecie) under Heinrich von Plauen[41] and marched the main forces to organise a line of defence on the Drewenz River (Drwęca) near Kauernik (Kurzętnik).[42] The river crossing was fortified with stockades.[43] On July 11, after meeting with his eight-member war council,[38] Jogaila decided against crossing the river at such a strong defensible position. The army would instead bypass the river crossing by turning east, towards its sources, where no other major rivers separated his army from Marienburg.[42] The march continued east towards Soldau (Działdowo), although no attempt was made to capture the town.[44] The Teutonic army followed the Drewenz River north, crossed it near Löbau (Lubawa), and then moved east in parallel with the Polish–Lithuanian army. The latter ravaged the village of Gilgenburg (Dąbrówno).[45] Von Jungingen was so enraged by the atrocities that he swore to defeat the invaders in battle.[46]
[edit] Battle preparations
In the early morning of July 15, 1410, both armies met in an area covering approximately 4 km2 (1.5 sq mi) between the villages of Grunwald, Tannenberg (StÄ™bark) and Ludwigsdorf (Åodwigowo).[47] Both armies formed opposing lines along a northeast–southwest axis. The Polish–Lithuanian army was positioned in front and east of Ludwigsdorf and Tannenberg.[48] Polish heavy cavalry formed the left flank, Lithuanian light cavalry formed the right flank, while various mercenary troops formed the center. Their men were organized in three lines of wedge-shaped formations about 20 men deep.[48] The Teutonic forces concentrated their elite heavy cavalry, commanded by Grand Marshal Frederic von Wallenrode, against the Lithuanians.[47] The Knights, who were the first to organize their army for the battle, hoped to provoke Poles or Lithuanians to attack first. Their troops, wearing heavy armor, had to stand in scorching sun for several hours waiting for an attack.[49] One chronicle suggested that they had dug pits that an attacking army would fall into.[50] They also attempted to use field artillery, but a light rain dampened their powder and only two cannon shots were fired.[49] As Jogaila delayed, Grand Master sent messengers with two swords to "assist Jogaila and Vytautas in battle". The swords were meant as an insult and provocation.[51] Known as the Grunwald Swords, they became one of the national symbols of Poland.
Vytautas, supported by a few Polish banners, started an assault on the left flank of the Teutonic forces.[49] After more than an hour of heavy fighting, the Lithuanian light cavalry started a full retreat. Jan DÅ‚ugosz described this development as a complete annihilation of the entire Lithuanian army. According to DÅ‚ugosz, the Knights assumed that victory was theirs, broke their formation for a disorganized pursuit of the retreating Lithuanians, and gathered much loot before returning to the battlefield to face the Polish troops.[52] He made no mention of the Lithuanians that returned to the battlefield. Thus DÅ‚ugosz portrayed the battle as a single-handed Polish victory.[52] This view has been challenged by modern historians. They proposed that the retreat was a planned, strategic maneuver, borrowed from the Golden Horde.[53] The same false retreat was used in the Battle of the Vorskla River of 1399, where the Lithuanian army was dealt a crushing defeat and Vytautas himself barely escaped alive.[54] This theory is supported by a German letter, discovered and published by Swedish historian Sven Ekdahl in 1963.[55] The letter cautions the new Grand Master to look out for false retreats of the kind that were used in the Great Battle.[15] Stephen Turnbull asserted that the Lithuanian retreat did not quite fit the tried formula of a false retreat. Such a retreat was usually staged by one or two units (as opposed to almost an entire army) and was swiftly followed by a counterattack (whereas the Lithuanians returned late in the battle).[56]
[edit] Battle continues: Polish–Teutonic fight
While the Lithuanians were retreating, heavy fighting began between Polish and Teutonic forces. Teutonic forces, commanded by Grand Komtur Kuno von Lichtenstein, concentrated on the Polish right flank. Six of the von Walenrode banners did not pursue the retreating Lithuanians and joined the attack on the right flank.[30] A particularly high-value target was the royal banner of Kraków. It seemed that the Knights were gaining the upper hand and at one point the royal standard-bearer Marcin of Wrocimowice lost the Kraków banner.[57] However, it was soon recaptured and fighting continued. Jogaila deployed his reserves – the second line of his army.[30] Grand Master Ulrich von Jungingen then personally led 16 banners, almost a third of the original Teutonic strength, to the right Polish flank[58] and Jogaila deployed his last reserves, the third line of his army.[30] The melee reached the Polish command and one Knight, identified as Lupold or Diepold of Kökeritz, charged directly against King Jogaila.[59] Jogaila's secretary, Zbigniew Oleśnicki, saved the king's life, gaining royal favor and becoming one of the most influential people in Poland.[16]
[edit] Battle ends: Teutonic Knights defeated
At that time, the reorganized Lithuanians returned to the battle, attacking von Jungingen from the rear.[60] The Teutonic forces were by then becoming outnumbered by the mass of Polish knights and the advancing Lithuanian cavalry. As von Jungingen attempted to break through the Lithuanian lines, he was killed.[60] According to Cronica conflictus, Dobiesław of Oleśnica thrust a lance through Grand Master's neck,[60] while Długosz presented Mszczuj of Skrzynno as the killer. Surrounded and leaderless, the Teutonic Knights began to retreat. Part of the routed units retreated towards their camp. This move backfired when the camp followers turned against their masters and joined the manhunt.[61] The knights attempted to build a wagon fort: the camp was surrounded by wagons serving as an improvised fortification.[61] However, the defense was soon broken and the camp was ravaged. According to Cronica conflictus, more Knights died there than in the battlefield.[61] The battle lasted for about ten hours.[30]
The Teutonic Knights attributed the defeat to treason on the part of Nikolaus von Renys (Mikołaj of Ryńsk), commander of the Culm (Chełmno) banner, and he was beheaded without a trial.[62] He was the founder and leader of the Lizard Union, a group of Knights sympathetic to Poland. According to the Knights, von Renys lowered his banner, which was taken as a signal of surrender and led to the panicked retreat.[63] The legend that the Knights were "stabbed in the back" was echoed in the post-World War I stab-in-the-back legend and preoccupied German historiography of the battle until 1945.[62]
[edit] Aftermath
[edit] Casualties and captives
The battle as depicted in the Berner Chronik of Diebold Schilling
The defeat of the Teutonic Knights was resounding. About 8,000 Teuton soldiers were killed[64] and an additional 14,000 were taken captive.[65] According to Teutonic payroll records, only 1,427 men reported back to Marienburg to claim their pay.[65] Of 1,200 men sent from Danzig, only 300 returned.[66] According to different sources, some 200 or 400 brothers of the Order were killed, including much of the Teutonic leadership – Grand Master Ulrich von Jungingen, Grand Marshal Friedrich von Wallenrode, Grand Komtur Kuno von Lichtenstein, Grand Treasurer Thomas von Merheim, Marshal of Supply Forces Albrecht von Schwartzburg, and ten of the komturs.[67] Markward von Salzbach, Komtur of Brandenburg (Ushakovo), and Heinrich Schaumburg, voigt of Sambia, were executed by order of Vytautas after the battle.[65] The bodies of von Jungingen and other high-ranking officials were transported to Marienburg Castle for burial on July 19.[68] Bodies of lower-ranking Teutonic officials and twelve Polish knights were buried at the church in Tannenberg.[68] The rest of the dead were buried in several mass graves. The highest- ranking Teutonic official to escape the battle was Werner von Tettinger, Komtur of Elbing (Elbląg).[65]
Polish and Lithuanian forces took several thousand captives. Among those taken were Dukes Konrad VII of Oels (Oleśnica) and Casimir V of Pomerania.[69] Most of the commoners and mercenaries were released shortly after the battle on condition that they report to Kraków on November 11, 1410.[70] Only those that were expected to pay ransom were kept in captivity. Considerable ransoms were recorded; the mercenary Holbracht von Loym had to pay sixty times the number of 150 Prague groschen, amounting to more than 30 kilograms of silver.[71]
and from wiki:
The precise number of soldiers involved has proven difficult to establish.[5] None of the contemporary sources provided reliable troop counts. Jan Długosz provided the number of the banners, the principal unit of each cavalry: 51 for the Knights, 50 for the Poles, and 40 for the Lithuanians.[31] However, it is unclear how many men were under each banner. The structure and number of infantry units (pikemen, archers, crossbowmen) and artillery units is unknown. Estimates, often biased by political and nationalistic considerations, were produced by various historians.[5] German historians tend to present lower numbers, while Polish historians tend to use higher estimates.[7] The high-end estimates by Polish historian Stefan Kuczyński of 39,000 Polish–Lithuanian and 27,000 Teutonic men[31] have been cited in western literature as "commonly accepted".[5][6][32]
While less numerous, the Teutonic army had advantages in discipline, military training, and superior military equipment.[29] Their heavy cavalry was one of the best in Europe. The Teutonic army was also equipped with bombards that could shoot lead and stone projectiles.[29] Both forces were composed of troops from several states and lands, including numerous mercenaries; for example, Bohemian mercenaries fought on each side.[33] The Knights also invited guest crusaders. Twenty-two different peoples, mostly Germanic, joined the Teutonic side.[34] Teutonic recruits included soldiers from Westphalia, Frisia, Austria, Swabia,[33] Stettin (Szczecin).[35] Two Hungarian nobles, Nicholas II Garay and Stibor of Stiboricz, brought 200 men for the Knights,[36] but support from Sigismund of Hungary was disappointing.[26]
Poland brought mercenaries from Moravia and Bohemia. The Czechs produced two full banners, under command of Jan Sokol of Lamberk.[1] Serving among the Czechs was Jan Žižka, future commander of the Hussite forces. Alexander the Good commanded Moldavian troops.[4] Vytautas gathered troops from Lithuanian and Ruthenian (modern Belarus and Ukraine) lands. The Lithuanian army included three banners from Smolensk, under the command of Jogaila's brother Lengvenis, and a contingent of Tatars of the Golden Horde, under the command of the exiled Khan Jalal ad-Din.[2] The overall commander of the joint Polish–Lithuanian forces was King Jogaila; however, he did not directly participate in the battle. The Lithuanian units were commanded directly by Grand Duke Vytautas, who was second in command and helped design the grand strategy of the campaign. Vytautas actively participated in the battle, managing both Lithuanian and Polish units.[37] Jan Długosz stated that the low-ranking Sword Bearer of the Crown Zyndram of Maszkowice commanded the Polish army, but that is highly doubtful.[38] More likely Marshal of the Crown Zbigniew of Brzezie commanded the Polish troops in the field.
[edit] Course of the battle
[edit] March into Prussia
The first stage of the Grunwald campaign was gathering all Polish–Lithuanian troops at Czerwinsk, a designated meeting point about 80 km (50 mi) from the Prussian border, where the joint army crossed the Vistula over a pontoon bridge.[39] This maneuver, which required precision and intense coordination among multi-ethnic forces, was accomplished in about a week from June 24 to June 30, 1410.[3] Polish soldiers from Greater Poland gathered in Poznań and those from Lesser Poland in Wolbórz. On June 24, 1410, Jogaila and Czech mercenaries arrived in Wolbórz.[3] Three days later, the Polish army was already at the meeting point. The Lithuanian army marched out from Vilnius on June 3 and joined up with the Ruthenian regiments in Hrodna.[3] They arrived in Czerwinsk on the same day as the Poles crossed the river. After the crossing, Masovian troops under Siemowit IV and Janusz I joined the Polish–Lithuanian army.[3] The massive force began its march north towards Marienburg (Malbork), capital of Prussia, on July 3. The Prussian border was crossed on July 9.[39]
The river crossing remained secret until Hungarian envoys, who were attempting to negotiate a peace, revealed it to the Teutonic Grand Master.[40] As soon as Ulrich von Jungingen grasped Polish–Lithuanian intentions, he left 3,000 men at Schwetz (Świecie) under Heinrich von Plauen[41] and marched the main forces to organise a line of defence on the Drewenz River (Drwęca) near Kauernik (Kurzętnik).[42] The river crossing was fortified with stockades.[43] On July 11, after meeting with his eight-member war council,[38] Jogaila decided against crossing the river at such a strong defensible position. The army would instead bypass the river crossing by turning east, towards its sources, where no other major rivers separated his army from Marienburg.[42] The march continued east towards Soldau (Działdowo), although no attempt was made to capture the town.[44] The Teutonic army followed the Drewenz River north, crossed it near Löbau (Lubawa), and then moved east in parallel with the Polish–Lithuanian army. The latter ravaged the village of Gilgenburg (Dąbrówno).[45] Von Jungingen was so enraged by the atrocities that he swore to defeat the invaders in battle.[46]
[edit] Battle preparations
In the early morning of July 15, 1410, both armies met in an area covering approximately 4 km2 (1.5 sq mi) between the villages of Grunwald, Tannenberg (StÄ™bark) and Ludwigsdorf (Åodwigowo).[47] Both armies formed opposing lines along a northeast–southwest axis. The Polish–Lithuanian army was positioned in front and east of Ludwigsdorf and Tannenberg.[48] Polish heavy cavalry formed the left flank, Lithuanian light cavalry formed the right flank, while various mercenary troops formed the center. Their men were organized in three lines of wedge-shaped formations about 20 men deep.[48] The Teutonic forces concentrated their elite heavy cavalry, commanded by Grand Marshal Frederic von Wallenrode, against the Lithuanians.[47] The Knights, who were the first to organize their army for the battle, hoped to provoke Poles or Lithuanians to attack first. Their troops, wearing heavy armor, had to stand in scorching sun for several hours waiting for an attack.[49] One chronicle suggested that they had dug pits that an attacking army would fall into.[50] They also attempted to use field artillery, but a light rain dampened their powder and only two cannon shots were fired.[49] As Jogaila delayed, Grand Master sent messengers with two swords to "assist Jogaila and Vytautas in battle". The swords were meant as an insult and provocation.[51] Known as the Grunwald Swords, they became one of the national symbols of Poland.
Vytautas, supported by a few Polish banners, started an assault on the left flank of the Teutonic forces.[49] After more than an hour of heavy fighting, the Lithuanian light cavalry started a full retreat. Jan DÅ‚ugosz described this development as a complete annihilation of the entire Lithuanian army. According to DÅ‚ugosz, the Knights assumed that victory was theirs, broke their formation for a disorganized pursuit of the retreating Lithuanians, and gathered much loot before returning to the battlefield to face the Polish troops.[52] He made no mention of the Lithuanians that returned to the battlefield. Thus DÅ‚ugosz portrayed the battle as a single-handed Polish victory.[52] This view has been challenged by modern historians. They proposed that the retreat was a planned, strategic maneuver, borrowed from the Golden Horde.[53] The same false retreat was used in the Battle of the Vorskla River of 1399, where the Lithuanian army was dealt a crushing defeat and Vytautas himself barely escaped alive.[54] This theory is supported by a German letter, discovered and published by Swedish historian Sven Ekdahl in 1963.[55] The letter cautions the new Grand Master to look out for false retreats of the kind that were used in the Great Battle.[15] Stephen Turnbull asserted that the Lithuanian retreat did not quite fit the tried formula of a false retreat. Such a retreat was usually staged by one or two units (as opposed to almost an entire army) and was swiftly followed by a counterattack (whereas the Lithuanians returned late in the battle).[56]
[edit] Battle continues: Polish–Teutonic fight
While the Lithuanians were retreating, heavy fighting began between Polish and Teutonic forces. Teutonic forces, commanded by Grand Komtur Kuno von Lichtenstein, concentrated on the Polish right flank. Six of the von Walenrode banners did not pursue the retreating Lithuanians and joined the attack on the right flank.[30] A particularly high-value target was the royal banner of Kraków. It seemed that the Knights were gaining the upper hand and at one point the royal standard-bearer Marcin of Wrocimowice lost the Kraków banner.[57] However, it was soon recaptured and fighting continued. Jogaila deployed his reserves – the second line of his army.[30] Grand Master Ulrich von Jungingen then personally led 16 banners, almost a third of the original Teutonic strength, to the right Polish flank[58] and Jogaila deployed his last reserves, the third line of his army.[30] The melee reached the Polish command and one Knight, identified as Lupold or Diepold of Kökeritz, charged directly against King Jogaila.[59] Jogaila's secretary, Zbigniew Oleśnicki, saved the king's life, gaining royal favor and becoming one of the most influential people in Poland.[16]
[edit] Battle ends: Teutonic Knights defeated
At that time, the reorganized Lithuanians returned to the battle, attacking von Jungingen from the rear.[60] The Teutonic forces were by then becoming outnumbered by the mass of Polish knights and the advancing Lithuanian cavalry. As von Jungingen attempted to break through the Lithuanian lines, he was killed.[60] According to Cronica conflictus, Dobiesław of Oleśnica thrust a lance through Grand Master's neck,[60] while Długosz presented Mszczuj of Skrzynno as the killer. Surrounded and leaderless, the Teutonic Knights began to retreat. Part of the routed units retreated towards their camp. This move backfired when the camp followers turned against their masters and joined the manhunt.[61] The knights attempted to build a wagon fort: the camp was surrounded by wagons serving as an improvised fortification.[61] However, the defense was soon broken and the camp was ravaged. According to Cronica conflictus, more Knights died there than in the battlefield.[61] The battle lasted for about ten hours.[30]
The Teutonic Knights attributed the defeat to treason on the part of Nikolaus von Renys (Mikołaj of Ryńsk), commander of the Culm (Chełmno) banner, and he was beheaded without a trial.[62] He was the founder and leader of the Lizard Union, a group of Knights sympathetic to Poland. According to the Knights, von Renys lowered his banner, which was taken as a signal of surrender and led to the panicked retreat.[63] The legend that the Knights were "stabbed in the back" was echoed in the post-World War I stab-in-the-back legend and preoccupied German historiography of the battle until 1945.[62]
[edit] Aftermath
[edit] Casualties and captives
The battle as depicted in the Berner Chronik of Diebold Schilling
The defeat of the Teutonic Knights was resounding. About 8,000 Teuton soldiers were killed[64] and an additional 14,000 were taken captive.[65] According to Teutonic payroll records, only 1,427 men reported back to Marienburg to claim their pay.[65] Of 1,200 men sent from Danzig, only 300 returned.[66] According to different sources, some 200 or 400 brothers of the Order were killed, including much of the Teutonic leadership – Grand Master Ulrich von Jungingen, Grand Marshal Friedrich von Wallenrode, Grand Komtur Kuno von Lichtenstein, Grand Treasurer Thomas von Merheim, Marshal of Supply Forces Albrecht von Schwartzburg, and ten of the komturs.[67] Markward von Salzbach, Komtur of Brandenburg (Ushakovo), and Heinrich Schaumburg, voigt of Sambia, were executed by order of Vytautas after the battle.[65] The bodies of von Jungingen and other high-ranking officials were transported to Marienburg Castle for burial on July 19.[68] Bodies of lower-ranking Teutonic officials and twelve Polish knights were buried at the church in Tannenberg.[68] The rest of the dead were buried in several mass graves. The highest- ranking Teutonic official to escape the battle was Werner von Tettinger, Komtur of Elbing (Elbląg).[65]
Polish and Lithuanian forces took several thousand captives. Among those taken were Dukes Konrad VII of Oels (Oleśnica) and Casimir V of Pomerania.[69] Most of the commoners and mercenaries were released shortly after the battle on condition that they report to Kraków on November 11, 1410.[70] Only those that were expected to pay ransom were kept in captivity. Considerable ransoms were recorded; the mercenary Holbracht von Loym had to pay sixty times the number of 150 Prague groschen, amounting to more than 30 kilograms of silver.[71]