The following is an excerpt from a document I'm writing up to include with the Operation Windsor Campaign 'package.' Basically an outline of why the battle occurered and where my final thoughts sit. They changed over the two years I've been making it.
Final pack should include:
- The Campaign File
- 4 Maps for players to do as they please (a clean and a damaged version of both maps I made).
- The required mods.
- Read me.
- This document. (Incomplete).
Still thinking of maybe a standalone H2H only scenario that's a fictional take on the main assault with a lot of toys. Don't know.
Anyway a bit of a lit review without being too academic like my Uni days studying history. And yeah first draft so spelling, grammar... I know.
Operation Windsor
The Skipped Over Battle
After two years of on and off effort, one complete loss of work following a hard drive failure and project creep that went from the intention of creating just a single scenario to a full blown campaign – barring any future bugs, it’s finally ready for release. But why Operation Windsor? Why that ‘prelude to Operation Charnwood’ for a Combat Mission Battle for Normandy operation?
Windsor came to my attention many years ago; ironically from the German perspective rather than the attacking Canadians this operation follows. I was reading an academic journal article regarding the 12 SS Panzer Division in Normandy – forget which – but it was part of my undergraduate studies at the time. Though the topic in question at the time was around the atrocities committed by the SS Division, the small account (of no more than a few paragraphs) regarding the overwhelming firepower unleashed upon an understrength Panzer Grenadier battalion by the Allied forces, you couldn’t help but hold some begrudging respect. Eye witness accounts on both sides called the devastation unleashed upon Carpiquet ‘a man-made hell,’ and ‘inferno.’ To think any soldier could pick up and fight following this was to a young history school undergraduate simply astounding.
By chance, this was also a few years after a little title called Combat Mission Beyond Overlord and it’s follow up Barbarossa to Berlin was released, so I was clawing at any tactical accounts I could get my hands on and heading online via an early 256k broadband connection to see if anyone had created a scenario. Windsor has always stayed in the back of my mind.Fast forward many years, faster internet connection, the arrival and level of detail on offer from the CMx2 engine, and the apparent skipping over of the engagement with the release of the ‘Commonwealth Module’ which focused more on Operation Epsom, the idea to take on the Windsor challenge.
It proved very difficult during the map making stage, especially when it came to creating the airfield and the network of bunkers. When the Vehicle Pack was released allowing for the inclusion of the 79th Armoured Division, (‘Hobart’s Funnies’), and fixed the bunker problem, this meant the work could continue and allowed a far closer representation of the engagement than before.
This document isn't meant to be some historical essay on Operation Windsor, but to demonstrate the types of issues in the interpretation of this historical even into the CMx2 engine and explain some of the design choices I made. And as you would expect with something on this topic, spoilers ahead.
Forget the Airfield – The Changing View of Why Windsor Occurred
Like all historical research there are primary and secondary sources. The secondary sources can be further divided between initial and then the revisionist interpretations, the latter having many years of hindsight at their disposal unlike official histories which, while valuable, are usually clouded by official records and at times national prestige or guarded personal responses. Windsor is somewhat puzzling in that the reason for it occurring has always been glossed over or changed as time has progressed.
The traditional view has been linked to the notion that the Allies needed more airfields and/or it was a prelude to the larger Operation Charnwood that was already well underway in terms of planning. There is nothing definitive recorded as to its overall strategic reason for occurring. There is no document from someone like Montgomery or Dempsey stating why they wanted the airfield and village at the start of July. Not even the 3rd Canadian Division’s own commander, General Rod Keller appeared to be heavily involved in the planning of the operation that would in some way entail just under half of his overall forces; happy instead to delegate authority to Brigadier Blackader of the 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade who would be leading the attack. Keller would however be on hand to offer quick support and advice where and when requested. It does appear everyone from Keller upwards was more focused on the planning for Charnwood than this comparatively small sideshow.
Most accounts of the operation are no more than a few paragraphs in a wider account of Operation Charnwood or the Canadian experience in Normandy. In most of the secondary accounts it is simply stated the Canadians were to take the airfield and get the front line closer to Caen. Others paint it as a wasted effort of manpower and resources so close to a considerable military offensive that was already in the final stages of planning. It’s clear to see where these sentiments originate from when you review the 8th Brigade Operational Briefing papers themselves. They offer no insight into the reasoning for undertaking the action itself, only stating the intent of Windsor being:
“8 Cdn Inf Bde Gp will capture CARPIQUET village and airfield.â€
By early July, the Canadians had been staring at this airfield for just under a month. Though with hindsight it now seems a little ambitious, Carpiquet and its airfield was initially a
D-Day objective that proved a little out of reach for the Canadians; just as Caen had been for 3rd British Infantry Division. The first serious attempt by the Canadians to capture the objectives came a day later on June 7th from the north via Buron and Authie. They never arrived as this narrow front armoured thrust led to the Canadians being caught in a devastating ambush around Authie by the newly arrived 12 SS Panzer in its first engagement. Canadian armoured and infantry forces involved were decimated and helped guarantee a frontline north of Caen for the coming weeks.
Weeks went by with brutal largely static fighting for the Canadians in the first week. The focus of Commonwealth efforts shifted in late June with Operation Epsom. The 3rd Canadian Infantry Division was to attack at the tail end of Operation Epsom, with their own Operation Ottawa, taking advantage of the suspected thin line of German defences following Epsom drawing German units away from the Caen front. However the attack was not to be following Ottawa’s postponement as Epsom bogged down under ferocious SS counter attacks that gave high command second thoughts. This continual focus on taking the airfield all the way through June could help explain partly the traditional explanation for the impetus to for the 4th of July assault.
This long standing line of thought has only relatively recently been challenged, chiefly by David Patterson in his piece ‘Outside the Box: A New Perspective on Operation Windsor – The Rationale Behind the Attack on Carpiquet, 4 July 1944,’ in Canadian Military History: Vol. 17: Iss. 2, Article 7. Patterson states the long standing views were unfounded and that you have to visit the battle site itself to understand what was possibly going through the minds of British and Canadian commands in the last week of June and into early July. Patterson states that Windsor: … had very little to do with Operation Charnwood, and so much more to do with Operations Epsom and Jupiter. Windsor was fought for the ground itself, not the airfield infrastructure nor its proximity to Caen. The airfield sits upon the highest point of ground on the north side of the Odon valley and the river at its base. It has direct vision across all of the open terrain south west of Caen and more importantly for the Allied planners the looming feature Hill 112; the same feature which had just demonstrated its significance as a defensive terrain piece in the latter stages of Epsom. From the airfield a spotter with artillery support could have viewed any major attempts to take the hill (and likely did as 11th British Armoured made its way up the feature on the 28th of June).
Patterson states against the traditional argument of getting Allied forces closer to Caen prior to Charnwood is not correct, stating that Windsor began as Operation Ottawa, an action to help protect the left flank of Operation Epsom rather than a serious attempt at threatening Caen. In addition records from the 43rd British 'Wessex' Division show their own attacks against Verson within the Oden Valley itself, which coincided with the Canadian attack on July 4th was never seriously attempted stating they were in clear view from Germans manning the southern airfield hangers of Carpiquet eyeing their full advance. They only moved to take Verson once Operation Charnwood was underway and it was confirmed the Germans had pulled out from Carpiquet completely. Patterson also says it's quite apparent that Operation Jupiter, which was 'on call,' was launched 24 hours after the Canadians cleared Carpiquet airfield's southern edge and escarpment during the start of Operation Charnwood.
For Patterson (and the scenario designer) this is further proof the terrain was the deciding reason for launching Operation Windsor rather than Caen. If Operation Jupiter and the importance of Hill 112 was not the deciding factor for Operation Windsor or in the minds of British high command, sending the Canadians advancing across the open ground to Carpiquet would have been indeed a needless waste. Everyone in Commonwealth command (and indeed suspected by German senior officers) knew the big effort on Caen directly was looming. Taking the Carpiquet objectives as part of this major effort could have been relatively easy while the 12 SS Panzer were under attack simultaneously from three Allied divisions, rather than only one reinforced brigade they faced on the 4th of July. During Windsor, the Canadians were the main effort anywhere across British lines allowing for the Germans to react to this relative ‘pin prick’ in their defensive line - something even the British planners would have to appreciate in their risk assessments for launching any attack.
Patterson debunks the need for airfields argument on a number of levels, though primarily that by July there was no urgent call to base more aircraft in France. Though Carpiquet was no doubt ably eyed off keenly by D-Day planners looking for the ability to base aircraft in France as quickly as possible, (as such it became an initial D-Day target for the Canadians), by July the airpower situation was very different to that of early June. Patterson’s research shows by the end of June there were 10 operational airfields in the British sector alone (with another five planned). There was little need for yet another airfield, which given the relative speed of the Commonwealth advance so far in France would also not likely be a safe distance away from the range of enemy artillery for some time. Additionally my own research shows that nowhere in the briefing documents or secondary accounts from soldiers taking part was there any direct mention of preserving airfield infrastructure as part of the mission brief. The sheer weight of the carpet bombardment which included the 15 inch guns from two Royal Navy vessels is evidence that preservation was not front and centre of the minds of British and Canadian planners.
Then there was the overall change in strategic situation. By July it was clear to Allied high command that the vulnerable invasion period where the Germans may throw the Allies back into the channel had well and truly passed. This allowed for a considerable degree of more long term planning. In effect they could prepare an operation to assist another looming operation to take Hill 112 or what otherwise would become Operation Jupiter. Additionally, the capture of Carpiquet would also assist for any future engagements in the more open terrain south of Caen, or what would become known as the bloody battles of Operations Atlantic and Spring. To shore up this theory, following the airfields complete capture four days after Windsor during Charnwood, the first units to occupy the liberated area were newly arrived artillery batteries from 2nd Canadian Infantry Division rather than RAF or RCAF personnel.
The German Experience
The common gap in any research at the tactical level is the comprehensive availability of testimonials and official records relating to the German war machine at this point in the war. The heavy focus on the Normandy campaign by western historians alleviates this usual pressure to some extent; however the dearth of material when compared to the corresponding Allied official and private accounts is significant. The information pertaining to specific operations or engagements at a scale that is replicated within Combat Mission can either assist or weaken the scenario designer’s research efforts further. Thankfully in the case with Windsor, the former was more of the case in this instance with the number of queries relying on educated guesswork being a relative minimum. This is largely down to two sources focusing on the unit history, The 12th SS by Hubert Meyer. Meyer, (not to be confused with the 12th SS Divisional Commander during most of the Normandy campaign, Kurt Meyer), was also an officer of the Division during the Normandy Campaign and the Divisional Commanding Officer by the end of the war. The second text that was of paramount importance in generating the German order of battle was the Waffen-SS Armour in Normandy: The Combat History of SS Panzer Regiment 12, by Norbert Számvéber. This second text provides a day by day account of the status, deployment and actions of the 12th SS Panzer Regiment during the Normandy campaign, largely drawn from official regimental diaries. In the period around the 4th and 5th of July it provided the missing link regarding the level of commitment of German armour against the Canadian assault, particularly details about the Panther deployment that is critical for the player to overcome during the second half of the campaign.
However despite these two comprehensive sources there was still a number of unanswered questions, or more accurately put the ‘known unknowns.’ Carpiquet airfield was in use by the Germans from 1940 as a launch site for German air attacks during the Battle of Britain and later ‘The Blitz’ of United Kingdom cities. It was always manned by Luftwaffe personnel so the question remained what happened to these men? There was no mention of the base personnel in any of the records, despite the likelihood they would have been required to undertake heavy fortification works leading up to the Normandy landings.
The lack of any major mention of these Luftwaffe ground personnel from multiple sources seemed to suggest they had long been redeployed or fled in response to the Allied invasion. The armoured battles taking place only a kilometre to the north around Authie and Franqueville on June 7, and without a defensive line at that time manning the Carpiquet defences, it is a fair estimation that untrained Luftwaffe ground personnel would have abandoned their positions. Though early order of battles for this campaign did include some poor quality Luftwaffe infantry manning bunkers and trench networks in the opening missions, on balance it was decided to replace them with additional SS troops of a higher quality. However this added to another problem – the relative Panzergrenadier strength of the 12 SS Panzer Division by the 4th of July.
The Division had been in almost continual battle for nearly a month at the time of Windsor, and Standartenfuhrer Kurt Meyer’s knew his infantry strength had been heavily hit. They had initially been fighting to the north of Carpiquet itself in the first weeks of June before being redeployed further west to hold against the British efforts during Operation Epsom. As Epsom died down following counterattacks from other SS Divisions, the 12 SS was returned to the Caen front to cover the same approach they had initially defended when first arriving on the 7th of June. This was possibly seen as a move by German high command to give the battered division a chance to reorganize as Montgomery had demonstrated he’d rather try to take Caen with flanking actions rather than through a direct assault up until that point.
Despite heavy infantry losses, what the division did have going in its favour was an abundance of heavy weaponry. Meyer also had the advantage of knowing about the impending assault in Carpiquet as a result poor radio discipline by the Canadians and British units in the area and returning 12th SS divisional soldiers who reported the Allied build up after slipping back to German lines from prior actions to the west in late June.
For a scenario designer this provides a problem. By the German's own account there was only 200 SS Panzergrenadiers facing the Canadians; 150 in the southern hangers and command buildings, 50 in the village covering the northern approach. For the northern approach especially, this would mean a wide open map and a literal cakewalk for the Canadians inside the Combat Mission engine. The southern map would hold a little better given the open terrain but not by much. As a result it was an early decision to boost the German infantry strength back to full, in an effort to make it a somewhat fair fight. It was probably the single biggest change to the order of battle for both sides and the most ahistorical, however having a wide expanse of a map with only enough defenders to hold a handful of locations would simply not pose a challenge or be fun for the player on the offensive.
Surprisingly the armour and heavy weapon support didn’t need any serious adjustment as it was largely off map assets that could be liberally spread across both maps in support. In addition, the Panthers from 12 SS Panzer Regiment would be a good match for the depleted squadrons of Shermans the player would have at their disposal. The only edit here was there were clear statements that by early July the 12th SS had no PAK AT Guns at their disposal after being lost in earlier engagements. The CMBN large bunkers that were provided through the Vehicle Pack were outfitted with PAK weapons which could not be emptied or having its crew replaced by simple infantry. In reality, these large bunkers had no ability for troops hunkering within them to fire on the enemy. Despite these inaccuracies it was decided to persist for map accuracy purposes. Though this gave the Germans more firepower on the direct approach to the airfield, as described in the Canadian briefing, this isn’t the route the player should be taking under any sane circumstances. If they follow the overall plan set out by the briefing the extra guns should be a mute issue while having the bunkers intact.
During the planning for the Normandy coastal defenses, the importance of the airfield was identified by German planners prior to the invasion much in the same way as their Allied counterparts after the landing. It had long been forgotten as an operational airfield and had instead been fortified heavily given its position along largely flat open ground. The relatively open ground for this part of Normandy, and the long kilometre plus length of the airfield itself was seen as the perfect armoured killing field for German AT weaponry. Much of the western approach defenses for Caen were centred on this fortified strongpoint as a result, with fixed emplacements including concrete bunkers, constructed in the expectation of a savage fight with the invading armies. Only around a kilometre out from the outskirts of Caen itself it was seen as a final defensive position before the historic city would be under direct threat.
The Canadian Experience
The 3rd Canadian Infantry Division with the 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade in support, had done exceptionally well on D-Day. A little known fact that not counting scattered airborne drops, the Canadians coming off the beaches had pushed deeper than any other allied formation that day. There were armoured sorties forward at night to the Caen-Bayeux railway, which runs along the northern map in this operation. However, whether it was over confidence, a lack of proper army cooperation between Divisions or a combination of both, this startling success was short lived as the Germans reacted quickly to the landings. As mentioned earlier, where June 6th had been a relative success, June 7th was an unmitigated disaster that helped dictate the Commonwealth frontline for the coming month.
The 3rd Canadian Infantry Division was seeing its first combat in Normandy. Formed early in the war it spent most of its time as a Division on garrison and training duties in England rather than being shipped to the Mediterranean. (Indeed it was joked the division’s soldiers fathered the most war babies of any Allied force based in the United Kingdom). Canadian army forces were overlooked for any combat operations in Africa, which was a point of heavy contention between the Canadian and United Kingdom governments, with the former being vocal of the apparent sidelining of Canadian forces doing their part in joint operations. Despite this idleness, the importance of officers having combat experience was not overlooked, with a number of Canadian Officers being rotated through British units during the North African campaign. A call for fresh forces for the invasion of Sicily led to the deployment of the 1st Canadian Infantry Division for Operation Husky in July 1943 also quickly built up the experience stocks among Canadian Officers, some of which would be rotated back to England prior to the Normandy Landings. (The Canadian army forces deployed in Italy would remain in that theatre until early 1945). For the standard private however, they were well trained but went through a vicious baptism of fire during the first weeks of June against the 12 SS Panzer Division.
By the 4th of July, the Canadians had suffered terribly but continued to man the lines after a small respite as attentions turned to the west of their positions with Operation Epsom. The flow of replacements and equipment came through, but in particularly for tanks it was never enough to overcome the horrendous losses against the proven German Panzer Divisions. The initial D-Day landing force continued to be the only Canadian army units operational in France, as Montgomery did everything he could to keep Canadian 1st Army General Harry Crerar ‘out of the game’ for as long as possible. (The two had a brief but turbulent time in Italy together while Crerar was deployed to gain combat experience commanding at the corps level before taking command of the Canadian Army in Normandy).
The order of battle for the Canadians was relatively straight forward thanks to a copy of the original briefing documents and accounts of the actions where they are available. Mark Zuehlke’s line of books on the Canadian experience is also highly recommended, particularly the Normandy trilogy. The only unknown in this case was the relative tank strength of the Canadian on July the 4th and to a lesser extent British via the 79th Armoured Division component taking part. The 10th Armoured Regiment – the Fort Garry Horse – had been in combat since D-Day and though they had replacement crews, the number of replacement tanks available was never able to keep up with losses. (As a side note, only one tank in the brigade that landed on D-Day was still operational by VE Day in May 1945). The decision was made to limit the armour down to 10 tanks per squadron. For the 79th Division, these were limited to roughly a platoon each, noting the specialised nature of their role and the fact the 79th operated ad-hoc, that is spread across the Commonwealth lines were there was need rather than as a single unit. This still gives the Canadian player ample armour to deal with the German threat.
The arrival timing of the armour, particularly for the southern map is however in line with the historical occurrence. This makes the 3rd mission in particularly incredibly hard, however no apologies are made in this respect as poor planning and delayed release orders to support the southern attack were a key component for the outcome of this Windsor in the authors opinion. The availability of the 79th Armoured is also largely limited to a possible 4th mission which can be missed if the player succeeds completely in mission 2. Again, no apology is made in this respect as all accounts that were reviewed suggested these armour pieces rolled forward after the main assault and came forward to ‘dig out’ small bands of fanatical Panzergrenadiers that refused to surrender. (Hence the scenario titles name).
The amount of off map support in this campaign is extensive; however it’s actually still scaled down from what the allies dumped on the village and the approach. The names and battery commitment was provided in the operational briefing documents and this has been recreated in the scenarios here. Unfortunately for the author, CMx2 doesn’t allow for scenario designers to pull off map support away from the player at a set time. Therefore the only real possibility was to provide the firing plan as part of the mission and trust that the player would ‘follow orders’ in this respect. The alternative was to start the early missions slightly later with a more devastated map, however this would take something away from the battle and getting a sense of the extreme chaos that was present prior to the Canadian infantry going in.
One area that was reduced however was the Canadian approach through the wheat fields to Carpiquet under German artillery fire. Pushing two battalions of infantry through Germany off map support for over a mile was never going to be fun for a player, and the potentially large variance of losses the player would suffer were far too high for this early inside a CMx2 operation where headcount replenishment was going to be limited. The alternative of using the briefing itself as a scene setter, demonstrating that the plan the player had just read had ‘all gone to hell’ would do more in this respect that having infantry trudge forward on a map for around an hour before any serious two way fighting occurs.
Final pack should include:
- The Campaign File
- 4 Maps for players to do as they please (a clean and a damaged version of both maps I made).
- The required mods.
- Read me.
- This document. (Incomplete).
Still thinking of maybe a standalone H2H only scenario that's a fictional take on the main assault with a lot of toys. Don't know.
Anyway a bit of a lit review without being too academic like my Uni days studying history. And yeah first draft so spelling, grammar... I know.
Operation Windsor
The Skipped Over Battle
After two years of on and off effort, one complete loss of work following a hard drive failure and project creep that went from the intention of creating just a single scenario to a full blown campaign – barring any future bugs, it’s finally ready for release. But why Operation Windsor? Why that ‘prelude to Operation Charnwood’ for a Combat Mission Battle for Normandy operation?
Windsor came to my attention many years ago; ironically from the German perspective rather than the attacking Canadians this operation follows. I was reading an academic journal article regarding the 12 SS Panzer Division in Normandy – forget which – but it was part of my undergraduate studies at the time. Though the topic in question at the time was around the atrocities committed by the SS Division, the small account (of no more than a few paragraphs) regarding the overwhelming firepower unleashed upon an understrength Panzer Grenadier battalion by the Allied forces, you couldn’t help but hold some begrudging respect. Eye witness accounts on both sides called the devastation unleashed upon Carpiquet ‘a man-made hell,’ and ‘inferno.’ To think any soldier could pick up and fight following this was to a young history school undergraduate simply astounding.
By chance, this was also a few years after a little title called Combat Mission Beyond Overlord and it’s follow up Barbarossa to Berlin was released, so I was clawing at any tactical accounts I could get my hands on and heading online via an early 256k broadband connection to see if anyone had created a scenario. Windsor has always stayed in the back of my mind.Fast forward many years, faster internet connection, the arrival and level of detail on offer from the CMx2 engine, and the apparent skipping over of the engagement with the release of the ‘Commonwealth Module’ which focused more on Operation Epsom, the idea to take on the Windsor challenge.
It proved very difficult during the map making stage, especially when it came to creating the airfield and the network of bunkers. When the Vehicle Pack was released allowing for the inclusion of the 79th Armoured Division, (‘Hobart’s Funnies’), and fixed the bunker problem, this meant the work could continue and allowed a far closer representation of the engagement than before.
This document isn't meant to be some historical essay on Operation Windsor, but to demonstrate the types of issues in the interpretation of this historical even into the CMx2 engine and explain some of the design choices I made. And as you would expect with something on this topic, spoilers ahead.
Forget the Airfield – The Changing View of Why Windsor Occurred
Like all historical research there are primary and secondary sources. The secondary sources can be further divided between initial and then the revisionist interpretations, the latter having many years of hindsight at their disposal unlike official histories which, while valuable, are usually clouded by official records and at times national prestige or guarded personal responses. Windsor is somewhat puzzling in that the reason for it occurring has always been glossed over or changed as time has progressed.
The traditional view has been linked to the notion that the Allies needed more airfields and/or it was a prelude to the larger Operation Charnwood that was already well underway in terms of planning. There is nothing definitive recorded as to its overall strategic reason for occurring. There is no document from someone like Montgomery or Dempsey stating why they wanted the airfield and village at the start of July. Not even the 3rd Canadian Division’s own commander, General Rod Keller appeared to be heavily involved in the planning of the operation that would in some way entail just under half of his overall forces; happy instead to delegate authority to Brigadier Blackader of the 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade who would be leading the attack. Keller would however be on hand to offer quick support and advice where and when requested. It does appear everyone from Keller upwards was more focused on the planning for Charnwood than this comparatively small sideshow.
Most accounts of the operation are no more than a few paragraphs in a wider account of Operation Charnwood or the Canadian experience in Normandy. In most of the secondary accounts it is simply stated the Canadians were to take the airfield and get the front line closer to Caen. Others paint it as a wasted effort of manpower and resources so close to a considerable military offensive that was already in the final stages of planning. It’s clear to see where these sentiments originate from when you review the 8th Brigade Operational Briefing papers themselves. They offer no insight into the reasoning for undertaking the action itself, only stating the intent of Windsor being:
“8 Cdn Inf Bde Gp will capture CARPIQUET village and airfield.â€
By early July, the Canadians had been staring at this airfield for just under a month. Though with hindsight it now seems a little ambitious, Carpiquet and its airfield was initially a
D-Day objective that proved a little out of reach for the Canadians; just as Caen had been for 3rd British Infantry Division. The first serious attempt by the Canadians to capture the objectives came a day later on June 7th from the north via Buron and Authie. They never arrived as this narrow front armoured thrust led to the Canadians being caught in a devastating ambush around Authie by the newly arrived 12 SS Panzer in its first engagement. Canadian armoured and infantry forces involved were decimated and helped guarantee a frontline north of Caen for the coming weeks.
Weeks went by with brutal largely static fighting for the Canadians in the first week. The focus of Commonwealth efforts shifted in late June with Operation Epsom. The 3rd Canadian Infantry Division was to attack at the tail end of Operation Epsom, with their own Operation Ottawa, taking advantage of the suspected thin line of German defences following Epsom drawing German units away from the Caen front. However the attack was not to be following Ottawa’s postponement as Epsom bogged down under ferocious SS counter attacks that gave high command second thoughts. This continual focus on taking the airfield all the way through June could help explain partly the traditional explanation for the impetus to for the 4th of July assault.
This long standing line of thought has only relatively recently been challenged, chiefly by David Patterson in his piece ‘Outside the Box: A New Perspective on Operation Windsor – The Rationale Behind the Attack on Carpiquet, 4 July 1944,’ in Canadian Military History: Vol. 17: Iss. 2, Article 7. Patterson states the long standing views were unfounded and that you have to visit the battle site itself to understand what was possibly going through the minds of British and Canadian commands in the last week of June and into early July. Patterson states that Windsor: … had very little to do with Operation Charnwood, and so much more to do with Operations Epsom and Jupiter. Windsor was fought for the ground itself, not the airfield infrastructure nor its proximity to Caen. The airfield sits upon the highest point of ground on the north side of the Odon valley and the river at its base. It has direct vision across all of the open terrain south west of Caen and more importantly for the Allied planners the looming feature Hill 112; the same feature which had just demonstrated its significance as a defensive terrain piece in the latter stages of Epsom. From the airfield a spotter with artillery support could have viewed any major attempts to take the hill (and likely did as 11th British Armoured made its way up the feature on the 28th of June).
Patterson states against the traditional argument of getting Allied forces closer to Caen prior to Charnwood is not correct, stating that Windsor began as Operation Ottawa, an action to help protect the left flank of Operation Epsom rather than a serious attempt at threatening Caen. In addition records from the 43rd British 'Wessex' Division show their own attacks against Verson within the Oden Valley itself, which coincided with the Canadian attack on July 4th was never seriously attempted stating they were in clear view from Germans manning the southern airfield hangers of Carpiquet eyeing their full advance. They only moved to take Verson once Operation Charnwood was underway and it was confirmed the Germans had pulled out from Carpiquet completely. Patterson also says it's quite apparent that Operation Jupiter, which was 'on call,' was launched 24 hours after the Canadians cleared Carpiquet airfield's southern edge and escarpment during the start of Operation Charnwood.
For Patterson (and the scenario designer) this is further proof the terrain was the deciding reason for launching Operation Windsor rather than Caen. If Operation Jupiter and the importance of Hill 112 was not the deciding factor for Operation Windsor or in the minds of British high command, sending the Canadians advancing across the open ground to Carpiquet would have been indeed a needless waste. Everyone in Commonwealth command (and indeed suspected by German senior officers) knew the big effort on Caen directly was looming. Taking the Carpiquet objectives as part of this major effort could have been relatively easy while the 12 SS Panzer were under attack simultaneously from three Allied divisions, rather than only one reinforced brigade they faced on the 4th of July. During Windsor, the Canadians were the main effort anywhere across British lines allowing for the Germans to react to this relative ‘pin prick’ in their defensive line - something even the British planners would have to appreciate in their risk assessments for launching any attack.
Patterson debunks the need for airfields argument on a number of levels, though primarily that by July there was no urgent call to base more aircraft in France. Though Carpiquet was no doubt ably eyed off keenly by D-Day planners looking for the ability to base aircraft in France as quickly as possible, (as such it became an initial D-Day target for the Canadians), by July the airpower situation was very different to that of early June. Patterson’s research shows by the end of June there were 10 operational airfields in the British sector alone (with another five planned). There was little need for yet another airfield, which given the relative speed of the Commonwealth advance so far in France would also not likely be a safe distance away from the range of enemy artillery for some time. Additionally my own research shows that nowhere in the briefing documents or secondary accounts from soldiers taking part was there any direct mention of preserving airfield infrastructure as part of the mission brief. The sheer weight of the carpet bombardment which included the 15 inch guns from two Royal Navy vessels is evidence that preservation was not front and centre of the minds of British and Canadian planners.
Then there was the overall change in strategic situation. By July it was clear to Allied high command that the vulnerable invasion period where the Germans may throw the Allies back into the channel had well and truly passed. This allowed for a considerable degree of more long term planning. In effect they could prepare an operation to assist another looming operation to take Hill 112 or what otherwise would become Operation Jupiter. Additionally, the capture of Carpiquet would also assist for any future engagements in the more open terrain south of Caen, or what would become known as the bloody battles of Operations Atlantic and Spring. To shore up this theory, following the airfields complete capture four days after Windsor during Charnwood, the first units to occupy the liberated area were newly arrived artillery batteries from 2nd Canadian Infantry Division rather than RAF or RCAF personnel.
The German Experience
The common gap in any research at the tactical level is the comprehensive availability of testimonials and official records relating to the German war machine at this point in the war. The heavy focus on the Normandy campaign by western historians alleviates this usual pressure to some extent; however the dearth of material when compared to the corresponding Allied official and private accounts is significant. The information pertaining to specific operations or engagements at a scale that is replicated within Combat Mission can either assist or weaken the scenario designer’s research efforts further. Thankfully in the case with Windsor, the former was more of the case in this instance with the number of queries relying on educated guesswork being a relative minimum. This is largely down to two sources focusing on the unit history, The 12th SS by Hubert Meyer. Meyer, (not to be confused with the 12th SS Divisional Commander during most of the Normandy campaign, Kurt Meyer), was also an officer of the Division during the Normandy Campaign and the Divisional Commanding Officer by the end of the war. The second text that was of paramount importance in generating the German order of battle was the Waffen-SS Armour in Normandy: The Combat History of SS Panzer Regiment 12, by Norbert Számvéber. This second text provides a day by day account of the status, deployment and actions of the 12th SS Panzer Regiment during the Normandy campaign, largely drawn from official regimental diaries. In the period around the 4th and 5th of July it provided the missing link regarding the level of commitment of German armour against the Canadian assault, particularly details about the Panther deployment that is critical for the player to overcome during the second half of the campaign.
However despite these two comprehensive sources there was still a number of unanswered questions, or more accurately put the ‘known unknowns.’ Carpiquet airfield was in use by the Germans from 1940 as a launch site for German air attacks during the Battle of Britain and later ‘The Blitz’ of United Kingdom cities. It was always manned by Luftwaffe personnel so the question remained what happened to these men? There was no mention of the base personnel in any of the records, despite the likelihood they would have been required to undertake heavy fortification works leading up to the Normandy landings.
The lack of any major mention of these Luftwaffe ground personnel from multiple sources seemed to suggest they had long been redeployed or fled in response to the Allied invasion. The armoured battles taking place only a kilometre to the north around Authie and Franqueville on June 7, and without a defensive line at that time manning the Carpiquet defences, it is a fair estimation that untrained Luftwaffe ground personnel would have abandoned their positions. Though early order of battles for this campaign did include some poor quality Luftwaffe infantry manning bunkers and trench networks in the opening missions, on balance it was decided to replace them with additional SS troops of a higher quality. However this added to another problem – the relative Panzergrenadier strength of the 12 SS Panzer Division by the 4th of July.
The Division had been in almost continual battle for nearly a month at the time of Windsor, and Standartenfuhrer Kurt Meyer’s knew his infantry strength had been heavily hit. They had initially been fighting to the north of Carpiquet itself in the first weeks of June before being redeployed further west to hold against the British efforts during Operation Epsom. As Epsom died down following counterattacks from other SS Divisions, the 12 SS was returned to the Caen front to cover the same approach they had initially defended when first arriving on the 7th of June. This was possibly seen as a move by German high command to give the battered division a chance to reorganize as Montgomery had demonstrated he’d rather try to take Caen with flanking actions rather than through a direct assault up until that point.
Despite heavy infantry losses, what the division did have going in its favour was an abundance of heavy weaponry. Meyer also had the advantage of knowing about the impending assault in Carpiquet as a result poor radio discipline by the Canadians and British units in the area and returning 12th SS divisional soldiers who reported the Allied build up after slipping back to German lines from prior actions to the west in late June.
For a scenario designer this provides a problem. By the German's own account there was only 200 SS Panzergrenadiers facing the Canadians; 150 in the southern hangers and command buildings, 50 in the village covering the northern approach. For the northern approach especially, this would mean a wide open map and a literal cakewalk for the Canadians inside the Combat Mission engine. The southern map would hold a little better given the open terrain but not by much. As a result it was an early decision to boost the German infantry strength back to full, in an effort to make it a somewhat fair fight. It was probably the single biggest change to the order of battle for both sides and the most ahistorical, however having a wide expanse of a map with only enough defenders to hold a handful of locations would simply not pose a challenge or be fun for the player on the offensive.
Surprisingly the armour and heavy weapon support didn’t need any serious adjustment as it was largely off map assets that could be liberally spread across both maps in support. In addition, the Panthers from 12 SS Panzer Regiment would be a good match for the depleted squadrons of Shermans the player would have at their disposal. The only edit here was there were clear statements that by early July the 12th SS had no PAK AT Guns at their disposal after being lost in earlier engagements. The CMBN large bunkers that were provided through the Vehicle Pack were outfitted with PAK weapons which could not be emptied or having its crew replaced by simple infantry. In reality, these large bunkers had no ability for troops hunkering within them to fire on the enemy. Despite these inaccuracies it was decided to persist for map accuracy purposes. Though this gave the Germans more firepower on the direct approach to the airfield, as described in the Canadian briefing, this isn’t the route the player should be taking under any sane circumstances. If they follow the overall plan set out by the briefing the extra guns should be a mute issue while having the bunkers intact.
During the planning for the Normandy coastal defenses, the importance of the airfield was identified by German planners prior to the invasion much in the same way as their Allied counterparts after the landing. It had long been forgotten as an operational airfield and had instead been fortified heavily given its position along largely flat open ground. The relatively open ground for this part of Normandy, and the long kilometre plus length of the airfield itself was seen as the perfect armoured killing field for German AT weaponry. Much of the western approach defenses for Caen were centred on this fortified strongpoint as a result, with fixed emplacements including concrete bunkers, constructed in the expectation of a savage fight with the invading armies. Only around a kilometre out from the outskirts of Caen itself it was seen as a final defensive position before the historic city would be under direct threat.
The Canadian Experience
The 3rd Canadian Infantry Division with the 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade in support, had done exceptionally well on D-Day. A little known fact that not counting scattered airborne drops, the Canadians coming off the beaches had pushed deeper than any other allied formation that day. There were armoured sorties forward at night to the Caen-Bayeux railway, which runs along the northern map in this operation. However, whether it was over confidence, a lack of proper army cooperation between Divisions or a combination of both, this startling success was short lived as the Germans reacted quickly to the landings. As mentioned earlier, where June 6th had been a relative success, June 7th was an unmitigated disaster that helped dictate the Commonwealth frontline for the coming month.
The 3rd Canadian Infantry Division was seeing its first combat in Normandy. Formed early in the war it spent most of its time as a Division on garrison and training duties in England rather than being shipped to the Mediterranean. (Indeed it was joked the division’s soldiers fathered the most war babies of any Allied force based in the United Kingdom). Canadian army forces were overlooked for any combat operations in Africa, which was a point of heavy contention between the Canadian and United Kingdom governments, with the former being vocal of the apparent sidelining of Canadian forces doing their part in joint operations. Despite this idleness, the importance of officers having combat experience was not overlooked, with a number of Canadian Officers being rotated through British units during the North African campaign. A call for fresh forces for the invasion of Sicily led to the deployment of the 1st Canadian Infantry Division for Operation Husky in July 1943 also quickly built up the experience stocks among Canadian Officers, some of which would be rotated back to England prior to the Normandy Landings. (The Canadian army forces deployed in Italy would remain in that theatre until early 1945). For the standard private however, they were well trained but went through a vicious baptism of fire during the first weeks of June against the 12 SS Panzer Division.
By the 4th of July, the Canadians had suffered terribly but continued to man the lines after a small respite as attentions turned to the west of their positions with Operation Epsom. The flow of replacements and equipment came through, but in particularly for tanks it was never enough to overcome the horrendous losses against the proven German Panzer Divisions. The initial D-Day landing force continued to be the only Canadian army units operational in France, as Montgomery did everything he could to keep Canadian 1st Army General Harry Crerar ‘out of the game’ for as long as possible. (The two had a brief but turbulent time in Italy together while Crerar was deployed to gain combat experience commanding at the corps level before taking command of the Canadian Army in Normandy).
The order of battle for the Canadians was relatively straight forward thanks to a copy of the original briefing documents and accounts of the actions where they are available. Mark Zuehlke’s line of books on the Canadian experience is also highly recommended, particularly the Normandy trilogy. The only unknown in this case was the relative tank strength of the Canadian on July the 4th and to a lesser extent British via the 79th Armoured Division component taking part. The 10th Armoured Regiment – the Fort Garry Horse – had been in combat since D-Day and though they had replacement crews, the number of replacement tanks available was never able to keep up with losses. (As a side note, only one tank in the brigade that landed on D-Day was still operational by VE Day in May 1945). The decision was made to limit the armour down to 10 tanks per squadron. For the 79th Division, these were limited to roughly a platoon each, noting the specialised nature of their role and the fact the 79th operated ad-hoc, that is spread across the Commonwealth lines were there was need rather than as a single unit. This still gives the Canadian player ample armour to deal with the German threat.
The arrival timing of the armour, particularly for the southern map is however in line with the historical occurrence. This makes the 3rd mission in particularly incredibly hard, however no apologies are made in this respect as poor planning and delayed release orders to support the southern attack were a key component for the outcome of this Windsor in the authors opinion. The availability of the 79th Armoured is also largely limited to a possible 4th mission which can be missed if the player succeeds completely in mission 2. Again, no apology is made in this respect as all accounts that were reviewed suggested these armour pieces rolled forward after the main assault and came forward to ‘dig out’ small bands of fanatical Panzergrenadiers that refused to surrender. (Hence the scenario titles name).
The amount of off map support in this campaign is extensive; however it’s actually still scaled down from what the allies dumped on the village and the approach. The names and battery commitment was provided in the operational briefing documents and this has been recreated in the scenarios here. Unfortunately for the author, CMx2 doesn’t allow for scenario designers to pull off map support away from the player at a set time. Therefore the only real possibility was to provide the firing plan as part of the mission and trust that the player would ‘follow orders’ in this respect. The alternative was to start the early missions slightly later with a more devastated map, however this would take something away from the battle and getting a sense of the extreme chaos that was present prior to the Canadian infantry going in.
One area that was reduced however was the Canadian approach through the wheat fields to Carpiquet under German artillery fire. Pushing two battalions of infantry through Germany off map support for over a mile was never going to be fun for a player, and the potentially large variance of losses the player would suffer were far too high for this early inside a CMx2 operation where headcount replenishment was going to be limited. The alternative of using the briefing itself as a scene setter, demonstrating that the plan the player had just read had ‘all gone to hell’ would do more in this respect that having infantry trudge forward on a map for around an hour before any serious two way fighting occurs.
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