Question of the Day #2
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Pallebahtep
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I think the answer depends on the definitions used. I think if it is considered objectively and every engagement before and after El Alamein is judged on whether it was a tactical defeat/victory then I "think" the statement is wrong - it must be, Market Garden saw significant british forces surrendering and the Battle of Britain should be regarded as a victory I think.
However I think that is to miss the point of Churchill's statement slightly. I read it as subjective from his leader-of-the-nation perspective, i.e. that he is likely assigning heavy top level meaning to the words victory and defeat? I have presumed that he meant to convey that before El Alamein there was no "Victory" which gave him significant grounds for optimism and likewise after the turning point there was no defeat significant enough to undermine the eventual defeat of Germany.
Whether it is true or not I do not know, I haven't read much by Churchill and don't know for example how he reacted to the reversals on the Eastern front in Summer 1942 and 1943.
I don't think the statement can stand up to much close examination to be honest.
However I think that is to miss the point of Churchill's statement slightly. I read it as subjective from his leader-of-the-nation perspective, i.e. that he is likely assigning heavy top level meaning to the words victory and defeat? I have presumed that he meant to convey that before El Alamein there was no "Victory" which gave him significant grounds for optimism and likewise after the turning point there was no defeat significant enough to undermine the eventual defeat of Germany.
Whether it is true or not I do not know, I haven't read much by Churchill and don't know for example how he reacted to the reversals on the Eastern front in Summer 1942 and 1943.
I don't think the statement can stand up to much close examination to be honest.
I think he probably meant it on a strategic level ... Market Garden was a defeat/failure as without capture of Arnhem Rhine crossings the whole operation was pointless.
There were quite a few failures and setbacks, but usually on a local/operational level -- but strategically, it was one-way traffic.
There were quite a few failures and setbacks, but usually on a local/operational level -- but strategically, it was one-way traffic.
In general I follow my previous speakers. I´m only a bit indecisive who he could have meant with "we". The British? Or the Allies in general. If he means the British only I would say he would have totally mistaken in every way. If he meant the Allies then it would be OK in the way PALLEBAHTEP has so eloquent phrased.
Greetings
Greetings
I concur with Pallebahtep. Strategically, Churchill's statement holds true; the British assumed the initiative for planning and operational conduct for their fronts the remainder of the war. Tactically, it is in error. Montgomery's re-positioning the failure to secure Caen after D-day "as part of the plan" and Market Garden as 90% victorious are specious claims for British victory.
Agree in full.
Tactically - Definitely not.
Operationally - Definitely some set backs within wider troop movements and plans, ie Caen, Market Garden, and you could argue most of the Italian Campaign which was Churchill's own pet project. However, given the situation the Allies could now afford to take these setbacks and still push forward unlike the first half of the war.
Strategically - Yes.
I think with hindsight Churchill realised it was from that point that he knew the Western Allies and the Soviets had gained the strategic initiative and dictated the flow of the war from that point onwards. Personally I'd place that date about six months later after Kursk and Sicily but each to their own.