The effects of massed firearms on grouped infantry were observed centuries before 1914. It seems a main concern was not vulnerability of the infantry to fire, but of the command and control radius of infantry units. Individual initiative in armies of the 1800's, say was historically low. Rankers of first world nations often were illiterate, very often conscripts. British manuals circa 1914 emphasized tight groupings of company-sized formations because they could be controlled by one or two officers, and probably as important to them, it had 'always been done that way.'WW1 taught commanders that human waves against machine guns were ineffective, common sense should have done the same thing.
Really? So if you could go back to WW1, you would group assault a machine gun nest, because its the thing we have always done. Simply because there isn't any other plan? I humbly beg to disagree, the officer on the grounds job is to develop tactics to meet an enemy's threat, orthodox or not. Failure to adapt to an ever changing environment is the mark of a failed officer and a fool.
Go ask the French if sticking to the Maginot plan was a war winner. An American soldier will tell you, follow the manual only as long as it works, when it stops working, toss the manual. Tactics don't evolve by themselves, tactics evolve because officers and men adapt to changing conditions.
The French lost because they were unable to adapt quickly enough to a change in tactics.
Have you ever serviced under anincompetent? Its quite the experience.
How easy it is to second guess professionals 100 years after the fact. If the solutions were so simple, then why did millions of soldiers in all the combatant armies stay so oblivious to it for so long? Nonsense. Tactics and capabilities improved exponentially during the war, but it was a slow process. I'd suggest Rawlings' "Technology and the Canadian Corps", Corrigan's "Mud, Blood and Poppycock" and Desmond Morton's 'When Your Number's Up' for a good introduction to the evolution of military tactics.
I'll see if I can find a copy of them. Thanks.
Which is exactly what happened, so we seem to agree on everything but how long it takes.
Officers in the field can't afford to wait for a arm chair general to come up with the right strategy for the situation. They have to observe, calculate the odds and address the issue immediately. If what they decide works then its a good tactic, if not well, hopefully there will be someone left to report it didn't work.
You're arguing about strategy here. And the Germans didn't have any radically new strategies in the Battle of France (I presume that's what you mean - France was on the winning side in both World Wars). They relied on concentration of force, and the battle of annihilation. They certainly had new technologies to aid them in their strategies.
Strategy is the plan which failed for the French and was successful for the Germans. Tactics are how they dealt with the failure or success. The French's strategy was to man and maintain the Maginot Line. The German's strategy was to bypass the line. The French strategy failed because their strategy was based on the faulty assumption that the Germans would just dust off their WW1 attack strategy and use it. The French might still have been able to defend against the bypass , they had units in place to do it with, but they failed to use the proper tactics to bring their available force to bear on the Germans. Strategy is the plan for dealing with the enemy, tactics is how you actually bring your forces to bear on the enemy. I know the difference between strategy and tactics. The French commanding general was an old man who didn't have the energy nor a proper staff to deal effectively with the German bypass.
Humans are by their nature incompetent. Vincent Bugliosi talks about this in book on the O.J. Simpson trial. I would say serving under incompetents is the normal human experience. What is not normal is expecting different.
How easy it is to second guess professionals 100 years after the fact. If the solutions were so simple, then why did millions of soldiers in all the combatant armies stay so oblivious to it for so long? Nonsense. Tactics and capabilities improved exponentially during the war, but it was a slow process. I'd suggest Rawlings' "Technology and the Canadian Corps", Corrigan's "Mud, Blood and Poppycock" and Desmond Morton's 'When Your Number's Up' for a good introduction to the evolution of military tactics.
Which is exactly what happened, so we seem to agree on everything but how long it takes.
You're arguing about strategy here. And the Germans didn't have any radically new strategies in the Battle of France (I presume that's what you mean - France was on the winning side in both World Wars). They relied on concentration of force, and the battle of annihilation. They certainly had new technologies to aid them in their strategies.
Lucky French. Then they drug us into Vietnam.
Humans are by their nature incompetent. Vincent Bugliosi talks about this in book on the O.J. Simpson trial. I would say serving under incompetents is the normal human experience. What is not normal is expecting different.
By not understanding how to quote my responses properly, you kind of prove my point about the nature of human incompetence. Humans are by nature lazy and incompetent. I've been in the Canadian military, part-time, for 29 years. Trust me when I tell you I've seen good officers and NCOs, and I've seen bad ones. And the good ones make as many mistakes as the bad ones. It's human nature. Thinking that any officer could have stepped on the battlefield in 1915, instantly deduced the "correct" thing to do, and then spread the word across the front is fantasy. It's expecting far too much. Which is exactly why militaries do train to fight the last war they fought. If you've actually served in the military, you will know how slow institutional change really is.I personally expect to be led by a reasonably well trained, competent officer. The US military does a reasonably good job of training its officers and usually backs them up with pretty good NCOs. By your statement I have to assume you're not American or haven't served in combat forces. New officers bungle quite a bit, the NCO's job is to tactfully put them back on track and advise them until the officers master their craft. Incompetent officers are usually spirited off to non combat duties, if they are unable to learn. No one catches the brass ring every time but they have too know where the ring is. Combat troops aren't normal people, as you think of normal people, the normal gets beaten out of them pretty quickly. If you start screwing up, they get nervous and irritable rather quickly and that's not good for your health.
Change is almost impossible in some cases. I'm surprised we don't still use muskets. One officer controls a few men, he decides what those few men are going to do. If you're caught in an ambush, you have no time to decide, you have to know what to do and do it.By not understanding how to quote my responses properly, you kind of prove my point about the nature of human incompetence. Humans are by nature lazy and incompetent. I've been in the Canadian military, part-time, for 29 years. Trust me when I tell you I've seen good officers and NCOs, and I've seen bad ones. And the good ones make as many mistakes as the bad ones. It's human nature. Thinking that any officer could have stepped on the battlefield in 1915, instantly deduced the "correct" thing to do, and then spread the word across the front is fantasy. It's expecting far too much. Which is exactly why militaries do train to fight the last war they fought. If you've actually served in the military, you will know how slow institutional change really is.
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It's easy to dismiss generals in 1914 as simple-minded fools, but tactics and technology go hand in hand, and there would be no real reason to expect advances in the latter to advance the other instantaneously. Even at that, "human wave" wasn't a term I would expect to find in any 1914 era infantry manual. Learning to fight in World War I was costly but it wasn't from a simple-minded inability to see what was plainly in front of their own eyes.