Not quite what you asked for - but I stumbled on this - naturally you may already have this...
Re the initial capture of the bridge...
15.00-16.30hrs
The two Bns move up the left CL, a disused railway, and reformed N of the station 335861 in the order: No. 1 Sqn (Major D.A. PEEL) and No. 2 Coy (Capt. A. HENDRY) combined HQs, No. 3 Coy and No. 3 Sqn, No. 4 Coy and No. 2 Sqn, and No. 1 Coy in reserve on the backs of ARVs, Honeys and any odd vehicle.
Our orders were to harbour in EXEL, which was reached and found clear at 16.00hrs . Almost at once further orders came to push on N to OVERPELT by a German military road and try to seize the main bridge at GROOTE BARRIER which was not yet blown, before dark. The HCR ahead had reported the road clear as far as the factory, where a patrol was observing the bridge. This was strongly defended by 88s and prepared for demolition.
The Commanding Officer immediately dispatched a Honey patrol to contact the HCR at the factory 3(?)51955 with all speed and ordered the column to advance NORTH.
19.45hrs
The HCR patrol was contacted and reported the bridge still not blown, and confirmed the presence of at least 2 88s on the N side of the bridge. Major PEEL’s Squadron after a very fast drive halted just short of the factory to close up and receive orders. The Commanding Officer stressed the great importance for future preparations of capturing the bridge intact, and ordered Major PEEL to attack and rush it a soon as possible. Being out of range either of the guns or the wireless we could have no artillery support.
Major PEEL then moved his Squadron up to the factory gates, debussed the infantry Coy, and rightly appreciating that any guns defending the bridge would be sited either on or near its N end or at the X rds S of it 353956 made his plan accordingly. The leading Troop No. 3, Lt. LAMPARD’s was to patrol slowly forward, towards the X rds accompanied by its infantry platoon (Lt J STANLEY-CLARKE) while the rest of the Squadron took up position at the bend of the road, Sqn HQ firing W to the X rds and No. 2 Troop Sjt BELL and No. 1 Troop L/Sjt SMITH firing at the bridge and it approaches. All tanks were ordered to keep up heavy Browning and HE fire, to discourage the German gunners. Covered by Sqn HQ, Lt. LAMPARD’s troop moved up towards the X rds and got his tanks into position 30 yds short of it to observe and fire on the bridge.
Major D.A. PEEL then dismounted and agreed with the Coy Commander that the leading troop and Platoon should rush the bridge, and if successful be followed across by the rest of the Group. He ordered Lt. D. LAMPARD to make his own plan with Lt. STANLEY-CLARKE.
Meanwhile Lt. D LAMPARD caught an 88 being towed across the bridge and knocked it out.
Another gun opened fire on him from the N end of the bridge but without effect. He then moved is troop up to the X rds and place his tanks among the houses on both sides of the road. L/Sjt McGURREN’s tank left, Sjt STEER’s and his own right. His fourth tank got a jammed case and had to withdraw from the action. As L/Sjt McGURREN crossed the road a third 88 fired on him from the cutting W of the bridge missed and merely got a heavy burst of Browning in return.
As Lt. D. LAMPARD’s rear and left were now secure, Sqn HQ switched its fire to the bridge, which now had 11 tanks shooting at it. Lt. LAMPARD dismounted and agreed with Lt. STANLEY-CLARKE to cover his platoon up the main road to within 100 yards of the bridge, when a GREEN VEREY light would be fired. This was a signal for all guns to fire only on the bridge; and when the infantry were ready for the final assault a RED VEREY light would be fired as a signal for all fire to cease and the leading tanks to charge.
It was 20.30hrs when the infantry moved down the road, took up their paositon and fired the GREEN VEREY light. For two minutes very heavy Browning fire came down on the bridge, which was now lit up by a house blazing on the right. The RED VEREY light went up and the tanks charged. L/Sjt McGURREN’s hit the corner of a house and stuck, so only Sjt STEER’s leading and Lt. LAMPARD’s actually did the assault. They went flat out, past the front section, over the bridge and halted in posn the N side. The infantry doubled close behind, came under fire Spandau on the road which was quickly knocked out by the Sherman and lay down around the tanks.
The ammunition of the knocked out 88 now began exploding on the bridge, but Major PEEL at once ordered the rest of the group to join Lt. LAMPARD on the far side. A Sapper officer Lt. HUTTON, with a party of 4 Guardsmen from 3rd Bn, followed the leading platoon, and climbed over the side of the bridge to cut the cables and remove the detonators of the charges on the piers.
The Commanding Officer then sent No. 3 Sqn and No. 3 Coy to reinforce No. 1 Sqn with all speed and take up position on the left of the road. The Combined HQ and reserve Sqn and Coys meanwhile formed a hedgehog between X rds and the S end of the bridge.
We then reported back on the HCR link that the bridge was captured intact and securely held and our success caused great joy in Higher Formations.
The Bns dug in for the night, awaiting a counter attack. But none came - not even a shell or mortar bomb.
Two unhappy prisoners of War captured by No. 1 Sqn from the infantry platoon that was supposed to protect the 88s said that the speed of our attack and advance had taken the gun crews, who were expecting their tank not ours that evening, completely by surprise. The fate of their fellow comrades on the bridge and the very heavy Browning and HE fire first put them off their aim and then made them remove to a safer if less heroic place. The Serjeant in charge of the demolition squad, in spite of a stirring speech he had made to the garrison earlier in the day that “the bridge must and will be blown†“that every man fights to the last roundâ€, was one of the first to leave, forgetting to press the switch. Their officer had fled the day before - again after some bellicose words.
Though the enemy made no attempt even to harass us in the night, at 08.00hrs next morning 11th SEPTEMBER reports came in of 6 Sps and a Coy of infantry W of the bridge in the village of de LUYKEN 3395. Suddenly an SP gun opened fire on the Recce Tp just by 2nd Bn HQ, while another shot down the road to the X rds past 3rd Bn HQ. The first tow shots killed 7 and wounded several of the Recce Tp, including Lt. B.C.P. WARREN and the Adjutant Capt. R.S. LANGTON who was helpting to carry a stretcher. This gun was quickly spotted in a field some 500 yds away and engaged by Major D.A. PEEL, who chanced to be at Bn HQ at the time and climbed aboard ST. PATRICK for the fight. He hit the gun 4 times and brewed it up, though half the honour is claimed by a FIREFLY of No. 3 Sqn which also fired from N of the canal. The second retired and took cover in the gardens further WEST. A lull followed during which the Recce Tanks moved out of the exposed field and drove down to the embankment by the bridge. On the way two were hit by the second SP gun, which opened fire again and one driver was wounded.
Major D.A. PEEL then handed over ST PATRICK to Lt. K.R. BRIANT, and went forward to observe for Major D.N.L. GORDON-WATSON in ULSTER. On his way through a garden he had the great misfortune to be dangerously wounded by another round from the SP, which still could not be spotted. Lt. BRIANT moved to ST PATRICK up towards the bridge trying to get a line on it, but again was seen first and ST PATRICK went up in flames. No-one was hurt.
After this the enemy withdrew and though one or two shots came from the houses, no more damage was done. Some prisoners brought in by 3rd Bn, said that about 1 Coy of mixed SS and infantry with some sappers and 6 Sps had been ordered to retake and blow the bridge. Their attack failed miserably and 3 more Sps were caught in the flank by a GRENADIER column working up from the SOUTH. The others were shelled by medium guns in de LUYKEN an hour later and heard of no more.
The rest of the day was quiet. In the afternoon 6 Typhoons attacked enemy withdrawing over the bridge at LOMMEL and destroyed the bridge. COLDSTREAM GROUP reinforced our positions with 2 Coys of 5 COLDM GUARDS over the river and 1 Sqn of 1 COLDM GDS in support S. While No. 2 Motor Coy, of 1 MOT GREN GDS took up an outpost position a mile ahead of us.
In the evening all slept soundly and undisturbed still without mortaring or shelling.
So re the Waffens - no doubt like you I have found lots of tracks and traces - nothing definite. I have read that Leibstandarte pulled out through this area, in early September, but were ordered away on the 4th for refit. The other interesting one I found was the Dutch SS unit Landstorm (34th SS Volunteer Grenadier Div) 2 battalions of which were initially fighting around the Merksem and Hasselt area.
I will have another dig at some point - but hope this is of interest - all good stuff...
