M
Mehlsack
Guest
If you are interested in military history you will love this book! This study explodes many of the myths concerning German Blitzkrieg warfare and the planning for the 1940 campaign. It is well written and contains a lot of detailed maps, charts and OOBs. That's why I strongly recommend to purchase it as a real book. Nevertheless I found a free ebook version:
http://epubbookonline.com/b/2431/frieser-karl-heinz/the-blitzkrieg-legend
From the preface:
In starting my research on the Westfeldzug 1940 (the 1940 campaign in the west), I naturally went along with the old theory that this campaign had from the very beginning been planned as a so-called blitzkrieg. The approximately fifteen hundred books and essays that I analyzed almost without exception confirmed this generally accepted idea. I was, therefore, surprised when the exact opposite began to emerge with increasing clarity during my archival research. As a member of Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (MGFA, Military History Research Office of the Bundeswehr) I had the opportunity over several years to go through the pertinent files of the Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv (Federal Military Archives) in Freiburg, specifically from the highest strategic echelon down to, in some cases (as regards the key episodes), the lowest tactical command echelon. This focus resulted in a new perspective. It became increasingly clear that the campaign in the west happened differently from the way it was planned.
Unfortunately, many of the files on the lower command echelons were destroyed during the war. Therefore I conducted interviews with numerous eyewitnesses. The German veterans’ associations that I approached were able to supply duplicates of many war diaries, after-action reports, and so on, whose originals had been burned. The files of the Service Historique de l’Armée de Terre (Historical Service of the French Army) in Vincennes also provided important references.
Naturally, it was impossible to cover the campaign in the west to its fullest extent, with all of the many different events that it featured. That also appears unnecessary in view of the way in which the point of main effort had been devised, so that it derived from the planning and course of the campaign itself. The campaign was decided by a single operation, called Sichelschnitt (the sickle cut). Actually, the decision had already come with Guderian’s operational breakthrough at Sedan. That battle—which featured the clash of two different concepts of war—signified a turning point in military history and will be covered in particularly great detail. The military events in the Netherlands, whose army capitulated after only five days, as well as those in northern Belgium recede into the background by comparison. The airborne troops that were dropped here were intended primarily to carry out an operational deception maneuver to divert attention from the actual point of main effort at Sedan. The second part of the campaign (Fall Rot, or Case Red) is also covered only as a brief afterword because the defeat of the Allies was already definite at that point in time.
http://epubbookonline.com/b/2431/frieser-karl-heinz/the-blitzkrieg-legend
From the preface:
In starting my research on the Westfeldzug 1940 (the 1940 campaign in the west), I naturally went along with the old theory that this campaign had from the very beginning been planned as a so-called blitzkrieg. The approximately fifteen hundred books and essays that I analyzed almost without exception confirmed this generally accepted idea. I was, therefore, surprised when the exact opposite began to emerge with increasing clarity during my archival research. As a member of Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (MGFA, Military History Research Office of the Bundeswehr) I had the opportunity over several years to go through the pertinent files of the Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv (Federal Military Archives) in Freiburg, specifically from the highest strategic echelon down to, in some cases (as regards the key episodes), the lowest tactical command echelon. This focus resulted in a new perspective. It became increasingly clear that the campaign in the west happened differently from the way it was planned.
Unfortunately, many of the files on the lower command echelons were destroyed during the war. Therefore I conducted interviews with numerous eyewitnesses. The German veterans’ associations that I approached were able to supply duplicates of many war diaries, after-action reports, and so on, whose originals had been burned. The files of the Service Historique de l’Armée de Terre (Historical Service of the French Army) in Vincennes also provided important references.
Naturally, it was impossible to cover the campaign in the west to its fullest extent, with all of the many different events that it featured. That also appears unnecessary in view of the way in which the point of main effort had been devised, so that it derived from the planning and course of the campaign itself. The campaign was decided by a single operation, called Sichelschnitt (the sickle cut). Actually, the decision had already come with Guderian’s operational breakthrough at Sedan. That battle—which featured the clash of two different concepts of war—signified a turning point in military history and will be covered in particularly great detail. The military events in the Netherlands, whose army capitulated after only five days, as well as those in northern Belgium recede into the background by comparison. The airborne troops that were dropped here were intended primarily to carry out an operational deception maneuver to divert attention from the actual point of main effort at Sedan. The second part of the campaign (Fall Rot, or Case Red) is also covered only as a brief afterword because the defeat of the Allies was already definite at that point in time.
