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The Lost Boys and The Road to Redemption

Kandu

FGM Colour Sergeant
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At 1045 on June 9th, 1944 the 3/325th GIR , 82nd Airborne made a suicidal and costly assault across the La Fiere causeway, supported by Capt. Rae's ad-hoc '90' of the 1/507th PIR. This would prove to be 'The Road to Redemption' (title of my next scenario) for 'The Lost Boys' of the 1/325th GIR from the debacle of the night of the 8/9th June.

So what happened on the 8/9th of June? Two converging operations conducted on that night should have resulted in a secure 82nd Abn. bridgehead across the Merderet between the La Fiere manor and Cauquigny. Why should it have succeeded? Col. Millet who up to this point had been isolated west of Amfreville had by this time accumulated the equivalent of a battalion of paras, mostly from his own regiment and was advancing from the west towards Lt. Col. Timmes in the orchard with the intent of bypassing Amfreville to the north and sliding between that town and the 'Grey Castle'. Simultaneously another American battalion, the 1/325th Glider Infantry was to cross the Merderet flood via a sunken road discovered by Lt. Col. Timmes' recon and move against Le Motey half-way to Amfreville. They were to anchor their right flank on Timmes but their left is unclear. The combined American forces west of the Merderet amounted to two full battalion equivalents plus the ad-hoc three companies of Lt. Col. Timmes - no small force. As far as I can discern, between them stood the II./1057 Grenadier Rgt at about 90% strength in and around Amfreville and the Grey Castle and the III./1057 at Cauquigny, le Motey, and Hameau Flaux, the latter probably reduced to about 60% strength by its unsuccessful assaults over the la Fiere causeway. Another battalion of this division was engaged with Lt. Col. Shanley to the south along with other support elements. A few platoons of Beutepanzer from the 100. Panzer Ersatz und Ausbildungs Abt. were also present and had been destroyed over the previous days. An FJ regiment and other smaller elements were also 'somewhere' in the area and the Germans were certainly very well supported by 105 mm and 150 mm artillery. More might be said about the German OOB in the area but suffiice it to say that I am of the impression that the Germans were outnumbered during the course of that night.

So how did it happen that half of Millet's force was destroyed and captured and the 1/325th forced to retreat back across the Merderet with severe casualties? The fact that the memorial to the 82nd Airborne's only Medal of Honor winner, Pfc. Charles deGlopper C Co. 325 GIR, is far to the south, nearer Hameau Flaux than le Motey, may yield a clue. So should the report of elements being driven back by fire from the Grey Castle. Let's consider the situation; a pitch dark night, everywhere the roads bordered by thick, tall St. Louis bocage and questionable maps and .. no wargamers' all-knowing all-seeing awareness. A single 'third-hand' account that I recently stumbled upon suggests that deGlopper's unit stumbled into a German battery. Beside's all that, this was the 325th's first action in Normandy and there was some disaffection among its troopers due to the renumbering of the regiment and a recent change of command. I believe that the 1/325 got lost, disoriented, disconnected from c2 and due to their lack of experience withered under the German counter-attacks. Their right flank had also stumbled too close to the Grey Castle and panicked under the MG fire from that position. Similarly, Millet's force, which had been travelling in single file column (must have been over 1 km long!?), stumbled into German positions. An apparently 'reluctant' commander (his attitude is debated) whom I won't name, leading the rear half of Millet's force appears to have become disconnected but he actually succeeded in reaching Lt. Col. Timmes' position but rather than dig-in in there, decided to skedaddle across to the east side of the Merderet along with the panicking 1/325th. The whole, I believe, was a debacle.

And so we come to the suicidal alternative the next morning. If we can't sneak across in the dark and retreat from positions we have gained after deeply penetrating west of the Merderet in the dark. let's all run across an 8 m wide elevated road nearly 500m long in full daylight and full view of the German dug-in positions! How is that a better alternative? But ... amazingly it worked, at no small cost. What was the rush? Why not wade across the Merderet again the next morning? Because (I know you're not supposed to begin a sentence with 'because') Gavin had the 4th Infantry Div. breathing down his neck ready to move west and the 82nd Abn was 'embarrassed' at not yet having secured their designated bridgehead by D+3.

That's my take on the situation. You may well have a different interpretation based on information you have at hand, not available to me. My view is teachable.

A footnote: The assault across the causeway was primarily secured by the 3/325th GIR but Gavin made no mention of the fact immediately thereafter, instead ascribing all the credit to 'his' 82nd Airborne and the ad-hoc A Co.'s 90 men led by Capt. Rae. "Bad form" (I quote captain Hook from Peter Pan).
 
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