The NATO bombing campaign was justified, as it was the only means to force Serbia to the negotiating table in the face of a looming refugee crisis. Serbia lost its opportunity to claim that Kosovo was an internal problem when it created a refugee flow into Europe. Thanks to the Bosnia experience, Europe was still highly sensitized to the social and economic burden of Balkan refugees, and was eager to prevent another such situation. The flood of refugees out of Kosovo after the bombing began only served to heighten European concerns and willingness to keep up military pressure. An important strategic lesson there, one Serbia failed to learn from its Bosnian experience - if Serbia had kept the Kosovar Albanians in Kosovo, it probably could have kept on dealing with them in any fashion it wished. As far as the above comparison of the Balkans to Cyprus, the difference is that Cyprus did not create a refugee problem that was thrust on the rest of Europe.
Through the aforementioned “terrorist attacks,†the Kosovar Albanians / UCK assuredly played a role in bringing down the wrath of the Serbs. But operationally, the Serbs erred in their response, using a hammer when they should have used a scalpel. A primary technique was to surround a Muslim village in a horseshoe, blast it with artillery, and wait for the villagers to flee out the open end of the horseshoe. The Serbian military and militias would then mop up, move to the next village and repeat – there was no attempt at a “hearts and minds†campaign.
I served with the NATO peacekeepers in Bosnia in ’96-’97, the UN peacekeepers in Macedonia in ’98, and led a company into Kosovo with the NATO peacekeepers in June ’99. While in Kosovo, I watched the flood of over three quarters of a million Muslim refugees return home to try to scratch out a living in the dirt of Kosovo, I exhumed the bodies from a mass grave of 60 and 80 year old Muslim men shot dead by Serbian para-militaries, and I watched home videos of young Muslim boys with their skulls smashed open. I then witnessed the Kosovar Albanians start to extract revenge, burning Serb homes, shooting Serb farmers off their tractors, and shelling Serb villages in the night. The Kosovar Albanians turned on others as well, accusing the Roma and Croat populations of Kosovo of collaboration and driving them out. The NATO forces made a good faith effort to protect everyone, but we could not be everywhere at once.
Both Serbs and Kosovar Albanians bear responsibility. But the Serbs had the upper hand, overplayed it, went on to reap what they had sewn, and the situation today is subsequently more tragic for the Serbs in their enclaves in Kosovo. But thanks to NATO at least now the bloodletting is a trickle instead of a hemorrhage, and a majority of the population has managed to stay in their homes and get on with their lives. The NATO solution was not perfect, but, contrary to the opening article, it did maintain peace and security in Europe, and was better than any alternative offered in this forum or elsewhere.
